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ABSTRACT 
Textual Disclosure in SEC Filings and Litigation Risk 
Arup Ganguly 
Katz Graduate School of Business 
University of Pittsburgh 
 
 
Prior studies are quite ambivalent on the relation between disclosure and litigation risk since 
greater disclosure can be perceived as either ex-ante deterrent or ex-post misleading. I hypothesize 
that more information is disclosed in the non-numerical narratives in SEC filings than that has 
been analyzed in the extant literature. Using comprehensive hand-collected data on federal 
securities class action lawsuits spanning nearly two decades, matched peers, and widely used 
measures in natural language processing (NLP) that capture degree, readability, and sentiments in 
textual disclosures, I find results consistent with the theoretical view that argues that more and 
difficult to comprehend disclosure is often perceived as ex-post misleading, hence, increasing the 
odds of litigations. After controlling for other explanatory numerical variables, these results are 
robust to various empirical specifications using difference-in-differences (DiD), principal 
component analyses (PCA), and market response, across different types of shareholder class action 
litigations. Finally, using the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling, Re: Silicon Graphics Inc., that 
led to an unexpected and sudden reduction in the threat of litigation for firms headquartered in the 
Ninth Circuit, I find that firms that are headquartered in the Ninth Circuit tend to use more 
uncertainty words in their filings post-shock, which is consistent with my main results. Such 
findings indicate that there is a need to distinguish between more versus better disclosures.    
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The extant corporate finance and accounting literature, despite the extensive research 
conducted on the relation between information disclosure and securities litigation risk, is still 
starkly divided on the nature of this association. The ex-ante deterrence school of thought predicts 
a negative association between disclosure and litigation risk, arguing that securities law and 
regulations create deterring incentives that encourage greater disclosure, increasing transparency 
and value-relevant information and hence reducing the likelihood of lawsuits. Another school of 
thought deduces a positive association, contending that greater disclosure can often be perceived 
as overly optimistic and ex-post misleading, hence triggering lawsuits. While these opposing 
viewpoints provide researchers and policymakers with useful theoretical frameworks for 
understanding the role of disclosures in precipitating or abating shareholder litigations, the critical 
question of how disclosures affect litigation risk is ultimately an empirical one. 
However, the empirical literature addressing this question is also split similarly in terms of 
their findings. While, empirical studies such as Skinner (1994) and Field, Lowry and Shu (2005) 
document that disclosure lessens the probability of a lawsuit, researchers such as Francis, Philbrick 
and Schipper (1994) and Rogers, Van Buskirk and Zechman (2011) indicate that greater disclosure 
results in more lawsuits. Lowry (2009) sums up this tension in the literature when she notes:  
“... we are still left with the same question: what is the nature of the relation between 
disclosure and litigation risk?” (p. 159). 
Empirical researchers in this field encounter two key challenges: First, prior empirical work 
is mainly focused on disclosures that are in numerical forms, such as earnings forecasts or 
announcements, various accounting variables, large stock-price drops, sales and earnings growth 
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and others. However, there is certainly more information and disclosure in the form of textual data 
(non-numerical narrative) that researchers have not yet fully explored in the context of litigation 
risk.1 Second, any attempt to empirically analyze the relation between disclosure and litigation risk 
and to claim a directional causality is prone to issues associated with endogeneity and 
identification. This paper attempts to address both of these challenges. First, it focusses on textual 
disclosure, while controlling for all the non-textual explanatory factors that have been identified 
in the prior literature. And, second, although this paper does not claim causality, it addresses the 
endogeneity issues to some extent in several ways indicating that there is perhaps an underlying 
predictive relation between textual disclosure in SEC filings and the likelihood of securities class 
action litigations.  
More precisely, I investigate the nature of the relation between  information disclosure and 
securities class action lawsuits by first extracting textual information disclosed by public 
corporations that have been sued and their matched peers, in their main SEC filings, i.e., the 10-
Ks and 10-Qs, and then employing panel data methods using various fixed effects, difference-in-
differences (DiD) methodology, principal component analyses (PCA), event studies and a quasi-
natural experiment to address endogeneity issues to a certain extent. 
I pose three central questions: First, does more disclosure through text in SEC filings (10-
Ks and 10-Qs) deter or trigger the incidence of securities class action lawsuits? Second, is 
readability, that is the ease with which a typical reader can comprehend the intended disclosed 
                                                          
1 Text analytics experts have long claimed that 80-85% of business-relevant information is in textual form. See 
https://breakthroughanalysis.com/2008/08/01/unstructured-data-and-the-80-percent-rule/  
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/watson/2016/05/biggest-data-challenges-might-not-even-know/ 
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message, associated with the probability of class action litigations? And third, are various 
disclosure tones or sentiments portrayed in the choice of words used in the narrative in SEC filings 
associated with the likelihood of shareholders’ class action litigations? 
I find a significant positive association between the degree of textual disclosure in both 10-
Ks and 10-Qs and the risk of securities class action litigations. More specifically, I document that 
increasing the number of words by 2.718 times (approximate value of e = 2.718) in a 10-K (10-Q) 
filing on average results in 59% (120%) increase in odds of being litigated. In other words, if the 
odds that a particular firm would be litigated happens to be 1 to 1, then, all else equal, nearly 
tripling the number of words in a 10-K (10-Q) would increase the odds to more than 1.59 (2.20) 
to 1. Such results are significant at the 1% level and are robust to seven different proxies for textual 
measures of the degree of disclosure.  
I further find, it is not just the degree of textual disclosure but also the difficulty level in 
comprehending the text used, i.e., its readability, that has significant predictive power in explaining 
the incidence of class action litigations. Using seven different readability measures as the main 
explanatory variable, I document a strong positive relation between the difficulty level of 
comprehending or understanding the text used and the probability of litigations. These results are 
also statistically significant at the 1% level and are robust to various controls used in the prior 
literature. Finally, I find that different sentiments induced with the choice of words in SEC filings 
can also be associated with the risk of being litigated in a class action. For instance, nearly tripling 
the number of uncertain words in a 10-K (10-Q) filing results in more than 79% (89%) increase in 
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odds of being litigated, significant at the 1% level. Such results are robust to using proportions 
instead of raw word counts and to different control variables.  
These results are also consistent throughout, both in the case of 10-Ks and 10-Qs, with 
stronger results in the case of 10-Qs, indicating that textual disclosures in 10-Qs have a greater 
predictive power in explaining the incidence of litigations, possibly because they are more frequent 
and contain more up-to-date information at the time of their release. I also find that the use of 
words that proxy for ex-ante uncertainty in the 10-Ks and 10-Qs are significantly and positively 
associated with longer case periods, and more negative cumulative abnormal returns around the 
case filing dates. Finally, I use the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling, Re: Silicon Graphics 
Inc., that led to an unexpected reduction in the threat of litigation for firms headquartered in the 
Ninth Circuit, and find that firms that are headquartered in the Ninth Circuit tend to use more 
uncertainty words in their filings post-shock, which is in line with my main results. Overall, such 
results support the theoretical view that argues more and difficult to comprehend disclosure is 
often perceived as ex-post misleading, hence, precipitating litigations. 
This paper contributes to at least four different strands of literature. First, it contributes to 
the literature on the relation between voluntary information disclosure and litigation risk by 
incorporating non-numerical, textual form of disclosure that has largely been ignored in the earlier 
literature (Core, 2001). Managers use not only financial, and accounting numbers for disclosure 
but also use natural language and narrative to communicate information to their shareholders. To 
the best of my knowledge, this is a first such comprehensive study, spanning nearly two decades 
of data, on the relation between narratives in SEC disclosures and securities class action litigations, 
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post Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) of 1995, that arguably made filing 
frivolous lawsuits difficult.  
Second, this paper is closely related to a growing body of literature in finance and 
accounting that uses textual analysis to answer questions in corporate finance and accounting 
research.2 Tetlock (2007) is one of the earliest studies in finance to have applied textual content 
analysis to a popular daily Wall Street Journal column to measure investor sentiments. Tetlock 
(2007) uses a widely-used Harvard’s General Inquirer word list to measure sentiments. I employ 
the same idea to compute various sentiment measures based on the texts used in 10-Ks and 10-Qs, 
and I have also used Harvard’s General Inquirer master lexicon. Loughran and McDonald (2011) 
recognize that word lists such as the Harvard’s General Inquirer word list are inadequate and 
potentially misleading when used in the context of corporate filings as they note that almost three-
fourths of the negative words in the Harvard’s General Inquirer word list do not have a pessimistic 
connotation in the context of SEC filings. Therefore, they created six different word lists that are 
arguably more suited for textual analysis of financial documents and are freely available at 
Professor McDonald’s website.3 I use both Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) and the Harvard’s 
General Inquirer word lists for the word-content analyses in this paper.  
Third, this paper provides some direct tests for the behavioral finance theories that apply 
psychology to finance and predict that manipulation of disclosures by firm’s management can 
provoke different reactions from investors resulting in over- or under-valuation (Hirshleifer and 
                                                          
2 Loughran and McDonald (2016), Das (2014) and Kearney and Liu (2014) provide excellent surveys on the use of 
textual analysis in finance.  
3 http://www.nd.edu/~mcdonald/Word_Lists.html   
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Teoh, 2003). More recently, Hirshleifer (2015) notes that “Verbal communication, such as 
misleading disclosures......., can also be used to incite misvaluation.” (p. 149). This paper 
measures the various sentiments used by firms’ management through their textual disclosures in 
filings and its influence on the likelihood of being litigated. 
Finally, this paper is also related to the heated academic and policy debates on the need 
and optimum level of regulation for financial disclosure as it indicates that it is not just the amount 
but also the form, comprehensibility, and quality of disclosure that matters.  
The paper has the following organization. The next section discusses the related literature. 
Following it, section 3 develops the hypotheses and section 4 describes the data and presents the 
summary statistics. The main results are presented in section 5. Section 6 uses a quasi-natural 
experiment to test how firms respond to a sudden reduction in litigation risk with respect to their 
textual disclosure in SEC filings. I conduct several robustness tests and address some potential 
endogeneity issues in section 7. Finally, I conclude in section 8.  
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2. RELATED LITERATURE 
 
Securities class actions are typically triggered by stock price drops and filed when a 
publicly listed firm or its managers make an (alleged) untrue statement of material fact or 
(supposedly) omit a critical piece of information in their disclosures. Such false statements or 
intentional omissions can adversely impact firm valuation. However, evidence on the relation 
between information disclosure and shareholder litigation is mixed in the extant literature. While 
on the one hand it has been argued that forward-looking voluntary disclosure can prove to be costly 
if perceived as overly optimistic and sometimes ex-post misleading, on the other hand, greater 
disclosure could also reduce the probability of shareholder litigations ex-ante by reducing the 
chances of omission of a material fact or negative news. The ex-ante deterrence theory is also 
prescribed by regulators, who often work under this premise that more information is better than 
less, especially after the corporate accounting scandals like Enron and WorldCom, which resulted 
in a knee-jerk reaction of Sarbanes-Oxley-Act of 2002.     
The voluntary nature of disclosure through texts further complicates this relation between 
disclosure and litigation, as firms can strategically and selectively choose to reveal information. 
Also, a significant portion of information revealed in textual narratives in filings often suffers from 
the non-verifiability problem and can be akin to “cheap talk” (Crawford and Sobel, 1982), which 
could be useless to the court. At the same time, the verifiable section of information revealed in 
narratives can be used as “signaling” (Spence, 1973) by high-type firms to differentiate themselves 
from the crowd.    
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Disclosure of positive versus negative news can also have distinctive impacts on the 
incidence of litigation. Skinner (1994) investigates earnings-related disclosures of a random 
sample of 93 NASDAQ firms during the period 1981-1990 and finds that firms take precautionary 
measures of voluntarily disclosing negative news to reduce the likelihood of shareholder litigation. 
Using data on 45 firms that were litigated during the period of January 1988 – September 1992, 
Francis, Philbrick and Schipper (1994) document an opposite result when they find that in their 
sample of litigated firms, early earnings warnings seemed to have precipitated shareholder 
litigations. Following these two influential papers, several academics have found evidence on both 
sides of the argument as Healy and Palepu (2001) point out in their survey paper, “The empirical 
evidence on the litigation hypothesis is mixed.” (p. 423).   
More recently, Field, Lowry and Shu (2005) recognize that the endogenous relation 
between information disclosure and shareholder litigation could be the potential cause of opposite 
results documented in the extant literature. They use a sample of 78 securities litigations that were 
filed between 1996 and 2000 and document a negative association between disclosure and 
litigation. Rogers and Van Buskirk (2009) take a time-series approach and investigate the change 
in disclosure behavior of firms after they have been litigated. Using a sample of 827 class action 
securities litigation cases filed during the period between 1996 and 2005, the authors report a 
significant decrease in the magnitude and precision of disclosures post-litigation and conclude that 
fear of litigation abets firms to reduce disclosure. However, the potential concern here is the 
generalizability of the results as their results are based on a sample of sued firms.  
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To the best of my knowledge, the only two papers that have analyzed textual content in 
relation to litigation risks are Rogers, Van Buskirk and Zechman (2011) and Hanley and Hoberg 
(2012). While Rogers, Van Buskirk and Zechman (2011) investigated the disclosure tone of a 
random sample of 20 firms that were litigated and conclude that the use of positive language in 
disclosures accentuates litigation risk, Hanley and Hoberg (2012) focussed their attention on IPO 
related litigations and utilizing word content analyses of IPO prospectuses document that greater 
disclosure is a substitute for underpricing and is efficacious in reducing the likelihood of all types 
of IPO related lawsuits. Interestingly, both these studies using textual analysis documented 
diametrically opposite results. In contrast, in this paper, I analyze a comprehensive sample of 
federal securities class action lawsuits during the time-period 1996-2014, and also examine the 
readability, besides degree and sentiments, in SEC filings by these firms as Hwang and Kim (2017) 
have recently documented that low readability of disclosure documents can cause investors to 
doubt and discount a firm’s value.   
Even after fifteen years, since the publication of the survey paper by Healy and Palepu 
(2001), in another comprehensive and more recent survey paper on the economics of disclosure, 
Leuz and Wysocki (2016) observed that, “…the evidence regarding the effects of litigation on 
disclosure is mixed and also quite subtle or nuanced…” (p.552).  
Overall, researchers are still divided on the nature of the association between the degree of 
information disclosure and the risk of securities litigations. Therefore, this paper systematically 
examines all the federal cases of securities class action lawsuits filed after the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 2014, and tracked by 
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the Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC) database and textually analyzes 10Ks and 10Qs 
of 2,137 litigated firms and 2,137  matched peer sample based on industry and firm characteristics.4  
 
  
                                                          
4 I start with 3,899 securities class action litigations filed in the Federal Court during the 1996-2014 period and after 
matching with stock price data from CRSP and accounting data from Compustat, my final sample comprises of 2,335 
cases of securities class action lawsuits.  
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3. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
The empirical predictions from theory on the association between disclosure and litigation 
risk are not always clear-cut. Similar to the economics of any other law enforcement, the 
deterrence theory on securities class action litigations hypothesizes that managers and executives 
of publicly listed firms should (ex-ante) respond proactively by enhancing voluntary disclosure to 
the deterring incentives created by securities law and regulations. Such line of thinking predicts a 
negative association between disclosure and incidence of litigations since with greater disclosure 
and transparency there is less likelihood of omission of value-relevant information and 
consequently lower litigation risk. More disclosure also makes it increasingly difficult for plaintiffs 
to establish “loss causation.”5 However, another theoretical perspective takes an ex-post view on 
this issue, arguing that greater disclosure can often be perceived as overly optimistic or 
overconfident and ex-post misleading that could potentially precipitate securities class action 
litigations. Banerjee, Humphery-Jenner, Nanda and Tham (2018) also found empirical evidence 
that the presence of an overconfident CEO or a senior executive in the firm increases its likelihood 
of being litigated in a securities class action. This line of literature predicts a positive association 
between disclosure and incidence of litigations. Therefore, it is ultimately an empirical question, 
and because of this ambiguity in the relation between disclosure and risk of litigations, I do not 
provide a directional hypothesis and ask:  
                                                          
5 “Loss causation” is a legal requirement for plaintiffs in securities class action lawsuits to show that the damage to 
shareholders was inflicted by information omission.  
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Does more disclosure through text in SEC filings deter or trigger the incidence of 
securities class action lawsuits? 
Another essential aspect of word content analysis is readability, which is often defined as 
the ease with which a typical reader can understand the intended message. It can be argued that it 
is not just the quantity of textual disclosure that can impact the incidence of class action lawsuits 
but also the ease of its interpretation that can influence the likelihood of lawsuits. Complex and 
difficult to comprehend language can potentially cause divergence in opinions on the same text, 
increasing the likelihood of litigations. Greater disclosure in abstruse language can often be 
perceived as confusing noise and can lessen transparency. Shareholders are constricted by bounded 
rationality (Simon, 1955) and limited cognitive ability to process information. Even experts and 
institutional investors can be prone to information overload (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003; Biggs, 
Bedard, Gaber and Linsmeier, 1985). Note that unstructured textual data can only be viewed as 
useful information, once it has been analyzed and interpreted, which requires time and effort. 
Hence, borrowing from the extant literature in natural language processing (NLP), computational 
linguistics and stylometry, I compute the commonly used readability indices for the SEC filings 
(10-Ks and 10-Qs) and hypothesize: 
Other things equal, there will be a significant positive association between the 
difficulty level in readability and the incidence of class action lawsuits. 
Besides the degree of disclosure and disclosure readability, disclosure sentiments or tone 
could potentially shape the relation between disclosure and litigations. Textual sentiments or tone 
analysis has been widely used in finance research, in which certain word lists have been created 
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from dictionaries with financial text in mind that convey sentiments such as positive words, 
negative words, uncertain words, litigious words, etc. Kearney and Liu (2014) have summarized 
the different techniques used in textual sentiment in the finance literature. One can also think of 
sentiments as a common cognitive error. The basic idea here is that both in the world of rational 
(Angeletos and La’O, 2013; Benhabib, Wang and Wen, 2015) and behavioral finance (Akerlof 
and Shiller, 2010; Shiller, 2015), the interpretation of textual sentiments can have a profound 
impact on shareholders’ behavior. Hence, I conjecture that: 
Ceteris paribus, various disclosure tones or sentiment measures will have 
differential effects on the likelihood of shareholders’ class action litigations. 
The main thrust of these hypotheses is to explore the direction and magnitude of the 
association between the three different dimensions (i.e., degree, readability, and sentiments) of 
textual disclosures in SEC filings and the risk of securities class action lawsuits.  
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4. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
4.1 Litigation Data 
I manually collect data on all securities class actions litigations filed in the Federal Court 
for the years 1996 to 2014. My primary source of litigation data is the Securities Class Action 
Clearinghouse (SCAC), a free, online database hosted by Stanford Law School in collaboration 
with Cornerstone Research.6 SCAC is one of the most widely used and prominent databases 
(Karpoff, Koester, Lee, and Martin, 2014) on securities class action lawsuits and encompasses 
information on federal civil securities class action lawsuits starting from 1996. I use SCAC 
database to collect data on indicator variable for the securities class action and other case details 
such as the case filing date, case status, case end date, case docket number, beginning of the class 
period and end of the class period. I also manually collect data on the settlement amount of the 
class actions if available from case summaries, 10-Ks, 10-Qs or 8-Ks, and media articles.  
Although I begin with 3,899 cases of federal civil securities class action litigations filed 
during the period 1996-2014, post-matching with stock price data from CRSP and accounting data 
from Compustat, my final sample constitutes of 2,335 cases of which 1,285 cases have been settled 
(including the ones adjudicated at trial), 917 cases were dismissed, and 133 cases were still active 
at the stage of data collection. Table 1 provides summary statistics on litigation data of my sample. 
Note that during the sample period under study, the number of securities litigations peaked in 2001, 
                                                          
6 http://securities.stanford.edu/ 
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which was partly due to the dot-com bubble crash of 2000 and it declined over time post-Sarbanes-
Oxley-Act of 2002. The mean case period, which is the time between the case filing date and case 
end date is 1,157 days and the mean class period, which is the time between the class start date 
and class end date is 506 days. The mean settlement amount is $28.2 million with a maximum of 
$3.2 billion and a minimum of $37,500. Appendix A provides the distribution of the litigations 
based on two-digit SIC industry code. The top three most frequently sued industries in my sample 
are business services, chemicals and allied services and electronic and other electrical equipment 
& components.   
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
4.2 Matched Sample 
Matching on observable characteristics is one of the popular statistical techniques used to 
address certain endogeneity issues in empirical corporate finance research (Roberts and Whited, 
2013). I start with 2,335 litigated firms and search the remaining population of firms not litigated 
that best match my “treated” firms in the following dimensions: 2-digit SIC code (perfectly 
matched), year (perfectly matched), size (measured by market value), return on assets (ROA), loss 
indicator, earnings growth and sales growth. For the set of analyses including IBES variables, I 
also match control sample with treated sample in terms of negative earnings surprise and number 
of analysts following. I select the nearest matched control firm for each of my “treated” firms, and 
the matching process is done without replacement to ensure independence among control firms 
16 
 
 
 
 
and to avoid multiple appearances by control firms.7 Treated firms are dropped if no matched 
control firms are found. Finally, I have 2,137 litigated firms as “treated” and 2,137 non-litigated 
firms as a matched peer sample. Table 2 checks the covariate balance to ensure that the “treated” 
and the “control” firms are similar in terms of the explanatory characteristics that influence 
disclosure.     
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 Not surprisingly, given my matching criteria, the observable characteristics of treated 
(firms that are litigated) and control (firms that are not litigated) sample are not significantly 
different as shown in Table 2. The differences both in the means (p-values reported in the last 
column of Table 2) and the medians (untabulated) are not significant.  
 
4.3 Textual Analysis Data 
I use a web crawler to download the 10Ks and 10Qs from SEC’s EDGAR (Electronic Data 
Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval) system.8 To clean the filings before creating various textual 
measures of disclosure, i.e., degree, readability and sentiments, I closely follow the methodologies 
of Li (2008), Miller (2010), Loughran and McDonald (2011) and Hwang and Kim (2017) with 
minor differences.  
First, I convert the pdfs into ASCII format. Then, I remove the graphics, XBRL and the 
unwanted markup tags (XML). I also remove the content between <SEC-HEADER> and the 
                                                          
7 Results are also robust to matching with replacement. 
8 https://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml 
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</SECHEADER> tags as it simply contains firm’s information such as name, address, year, etc. 
Since tables used in filings may or may not contain text, I only include the tables that have more 
than 65% alphabetical characters. I re-encode special characters like “&AMP” and remove the 
obvious proper nouns.  
Finally, I extract and parse texts from all the 10-Ks (and its variant:10KSB) and 10-Qs (and 
its variant:10QSB) SEC filings of my sample of litigated firms and the propensity-score matched 
sample from 1994 to 2014 using the programming language Python to create various variables 
used in degree of disclosure, readability and sentiments.9 I focus on two main SEC filings, i.e., 10-
Ks and 10-Qs as they are the two most frequently cited SEC filings in securities class action 
litigation complaints (Rogers, Van Buskirk and Zechman, 2011). I analyze all the 10-Ks and 10-
Qs of my sample firms and their matched sample, not only 365 days pre- and post- the case filing 
date, but also, a year before and after the year of the case filing date, as a robustness test. I also use 
two word lists or lexicons, namely, the Harvard’s General Inquirer word list and Loughran and 
McDonald (L-M) textual sentiments word list that are freely available and have been extensively 
used in the extant accounting and finance literature (Das, 2014; Loughran and McDonald, 2016) 
to construct textual sentiment variables.10,11 While the Harvard’s General Inquirer word list has 
been used widely for language analytics in many different fields, L-M word list is more suited to 
finance research, especially for textual analyses of SEC filings. The reasoning here is that certain 
                                                          
9 10KSB and 10QSB used to be filed by smaller companies. SEC removed such option of 10QSB on October 31st, 2008 
and the option of 10KSB on March 15th, 2009. Results are qualitatively similar without the inclusion of 10KSB and 
10QSB filings. 
10 http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~inquirer/homecat.htm 
11 http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/ 
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words that may have negative connotations in other areas may not have the same meaning in 
financial documents as Loughran and McDonald (2011) argue, “Words such as tax, cost, capital, 
board, liability, foreign, and vice are on the Harvard list. These words also appear with great 
frequency in the vast majority of 10-Ks, yet often do no more than name a board of directors or a 
company’s vice-presidents. Other words on the Harvard list, such as mine, cancer, crude (oil), 
tire, or capital, are more likely to identify a specific industry segment than reveal a negative 
financial event.” (p.36). 
After matching with Compustat, CRSP and litigation database and pre-screening the 
matched sample based on several observable characteristics, I textually analyze the 10-Ks and 10-
Qs of 2,137 litigated firms and 2,137 matched peer firms. Since companies file multiple 10-Qs and 
in some cases multiple 10-Ks, I take the average of textual variables in a particular firm-year-filing 
type.  
 
4.3.1 Disclosure Variables 
Disclosures in SEC filings are not just quantitative but are also text-based or narrative in 
nature.  I construct textual measures of the degree of disclosure by using seven different proxies 
such as the file size, word count, complex word count, sentence count, average words per sentence 
count, paragraph count and average words per paragraph. Appendix B provides the variable 
definitions for each of these disclosure variables. It can be argued that the bigger the file size or, 
the higher the various word counts, the greater is the degree of disclosure. Table 3.1 Panel A 
provides summary statistics of the textual disclosure variables for the 10-K filings from 1994 to 
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2014 by litigated firms versus matched non-litigated firms. The results in Panel A show that the 
degree of textual disclosure is significantly higher for firms that are litigated as compared to the 
matched firms that are not litigated in most of the measures (except when measured by “file size” 
and “Average No. of Words per Paragraph”, where the differences are not significant with p-values 
of 0.4323 and 0.5128 respectively). For instance, while the mean word count of 10-K filings for 
firms that were litigated is approximately 43,391, the mean word count of firms that were not 
litigated is around 38,563. The p-values for the differences in means are reported in the last 
column. The p-values (untabulated) for the differences in medians are qualitatively similar. I 
document similar results for the 10-Q filings in Table 3.2 Panel A. Such results indicate that ex- 
post there seems to be a positive association between the degree of disclosure and incidence of 
litigations.  
[Insert Table 3.1 here] 
[Insert Table 3.2 here] 
 
4.3.2 Readability Variables 
Next, I construct seven different readability variables, namely Flesch Reading Ease Index, 
Flesch-Kincaid Readability Index, RIX Readability Index, Gunning Fog Readability Index, 
Automated Readability Index, Smog Readability Index and Lasbarhets Readability Index for the 
10-K and 10-Q filings following extensive literature in computational linguistics. The details on 
the construction of these seven variables have been provided in the Appendix B. The main goal of 
all these readability measures is to come up with a scale, often using a linear combination of 
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sentence and (or) words characteristics that would indicate the degree of difficulty in 
comprehending a textual document. Except for the Flesch Reading Ease Index, the higher is the 
value of the readability variable, the greater is the degree of difficulty in understanding the intended 
message of the text. Panels B of Tables 3.1 and 3.2 present the summary statistics of the readability 
variables for 10-Ks and 10-Qs respectively. As hypothesized, for both 10-Ks and 10-Qs, these 
readability measures indicate that readability is significantly more difficult for firms that have been 
litigated versus the matched peer firms that were not litigated indicated by the p-values of their 
differences in means and medians (untabulated).  
 
4.3.3 Sentiment or Tone Variables 
Finally, following the previous accounting and finance literature (Das, 2014; Loughran and 
McDonald, 2016) in textual analysis, I construct fourteen different sentiment measures. The 
definitions of all these measures have been provided in the Appendix B. Two of these measures, 
the Harvard Negative Word Count and the Harvard Negative Word Proportion have been created 
using Harvard’s General Inquirer word list, while twelve L-M sentiment variables use Loughran 
and McDonald’s (L-M) textual sentiments word lists. Panel C (sentiment variables are measured 
in proportion) and Panel D (sentiment variables are measured by count) of Tables 3.1 and 3.2 
present the summary statistics of the sentiment variables for both 10-Ks and 10-Qs respectively.  
Some key points to note from the summary statistics. First, note that the negative word 
count and also the negative word percentage (proportion) used in 10-Ks and 10-Qs are significantly 
higher for the firms that have been litigated. This is true for both L-M Negative Word (Count and 
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Percentage) and Harvard Negative Word (Count and Percentage). These results suggest a positive 
association between the negative tone set in the filings and the incidence of litigation. 
Second, the positive word count and word percentage (proportion) used in 10-Ks and 10-
Qs are also significantly higher for the litigated firms in comparison to the non-litigated firms that 
indicates that positive tone or sentiments are perhaps construed as overly optimistic or ex-post 
misleading. 
Third, there seems to be a significantly higher use of L-M weak modal words (e.g., may, 
might, could, etc.) in 10-Ks and 10-Qs of the litigated firms. It is plausible that weak modal words 
signal trouble or wrong-doing in a firm. 
Fourth, the number and percentage of the L-M uncertainty words (e.g., depend, uncertain, 
indefinite, etc.) used in 10-K and 10-Q filings of litigated firms are also significantly higher than 
the non-litigated firms suggesting that uncertainty or ambiguity in tone could increase the 
likelihood of being litigated in a securities class action. 
Last but not the least, I use L-M’s litigious word list and find that firms that have been 
litigated have used significantly higher number and proportion of litigious words (e.g., claimant, 
testimony, tort, etc.) which could be possibly signaling a more litigious environment and hence 
increasing the probability of litigations. Again, the p-values (untabulated) for the differences in 
medians are qualitatively similar. Overall, such univariate tests indicate a positive association 
between the degree or difficulty level in comprehension of textual disclosure and incidence of 
securities class action lawsuits. Moreover, these univariate results also suggest a positive 
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association between the use of uncertain or ambiguous words and the likelihood of securities class 
action lawsuits.  
 
4.4 Other Independent Variables 
The other independent or control variables used have been selected based on the extant 
literature studying the relation between disclosure and litigation risk. Daily stock price data used 
to compute volatility comes from CRSP. Accounting data such as the firm size, market-to-book 
ratio, return on assets, earnings growth, sales growth and auditor quality have been taken from 
Compustat. Data on analyst following and negative earnings surprise is gathered from the IBES 
database. Appendix B describes these control variables. The next section discusses the main results 
in multivariate settings.  
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5. MAIN RESULTS 
 
5.1 Litigation Risk 
5.1.1 Degree of Disclosure 
So far univariate tests on the degree of textual disclosure have revealed a key finding that 
the degree of textual disclosure is significantly higher for the litigated firms as compared to the 
matched sample of non-litigated firms. I further test these results in a multivariate setting 
controlling for different firm and performance characteristics that have been found to be correlated 
with the incidence of litigation in the extant literature. I use a logit model where the regressand is 
a dichotomous variable indicating the incidence of securities class action lawsuit (1 for litigated 
and 0 for not litigated) and seven different proxies of textual measures of degree of disclosure as 
the main explanatory variable. I use the following empirical specification:  
Litigation Dummy i,t = β0 + δ * Disclosurei,t-1 + β1 * Xi,t + β2 * Xi,t-1 + εi,t          (1) 
The seven different proxies that have been used to measure the degree of textual disclosure 
are Ln (File Size), Ln (Word Count), Ln (Complex Word Count), Ln (Sentence Count), Ln 
(Average Words per Sentence), Ln (Paragraph Count) and Ln (Average Words per Paragraph). δ 
captures the effect of the degree of textual disclosure on the probability of the firm being litigated. 
Xi,t are the firm-level control variables, some of which are lagged, as suggested in the extant 
literature. The results for 10K and 10Q filings are shown in Table 4.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
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As shown in the table, I run separate regressions (as suggested by Loughran and McDonald, 
2013) for each of these measures of textual disclosure given the high correlations (as shown in 
Appendix D) between the different measures. All the regressions have year and industry fixed 
effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity across time and industries, and the standard errors 
have been clustered at the firm level. I also include as controls, variables that have been found 
significantly related to the likelihood of getting litigated in the extant literature, such as the firm 
size, return on assets (ROA), loss indicator (a dummy variable that equals to 1 if net income for 
the year is negative, and 0 otherwise), earnings and sales growth, market-to-book, big-8 auditor 
dummy, in addition to the lagged values of firm size, ROA, Tobin’s Q, loss indicator, stock 
volatility (measured as the standard deviation of daily stock returns, measured over a 365-day 
period), stock return and institutional ownership.12 In additional tests (Appendix C), I also include 
analyst following and negative earnings surprise, and the results stay the same qualitatively. Since 
the inclusion of IBES variables considerably reduces the sample size, I do not include them in the 
main results. While firm size and Tobin’s Q have been used as control variables in several textual 
analysis research (Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy, 2008; Loughran and McDonald, 
2011), earnings and sales growth, return on assets, analyst following, negative earnings surprise, 
volatility, and loss indicator have been found to be correlated with both tone and litigation risk 
(Rogers, Van Buskirk and Zechman, 2011). The extant literature has shown that auditors can also 
influence the quality and content of disclosures, which can impact the likelihood of being litigated. 
DeAngelo (1981) argues that auditor quality is associated with auditor size as bigger auditors with 
                                                          
12 For brevity, the coefficients on the vector of firm-level controls have been reported in Appendix E.  
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numerous clients are less dependent on “client specific quasi-rents” and hence provide better audit 
quality. Therefore, I control for audit quality using the Big 8.13 More recently, Bird and Karolyi 
(2016) show that institutional ownership can also impact firm disclosure and, hence, I control for 
it in all the specifications. 
The results show that there is a significant positive association between the degree of 
textual disclosure in both 10-Ks and 10-Qs and the incidence of securities class action litigations. 
Six out of the seven models depict this positive association in the case of 10-Ks, and all seven 
models illustrate this relation for 10-Qs, all significant at the 1% level. For instance, the coefficient 
on the ln (word count) is 0.463, which is significant at the 1% level. Therefore, the odds of being 
litigated (or the odds ratio) is e0.463 = 1.59, which shows that there is a 59-percentage change in 
odds of being litigated. In other words, increasing the number of words by 2.718 times 
(approximate value of e = 2.718) would result in 59 percentage change in odds of being litigated. 
That is, simply tripling the number of words used in a 10-K would result in more than 59 
percentage change in odds of being litigated which is both statistically and economically 
significant. 
Similarly, by tripling the number of complex words used in the 10-K filing, we would 
expect to see more than 65 percentage increase in the odds of being litigated.14 I also find a 
significantly positive association between litigation and file size, sentence count, average words 
per sentence count and paragraph count. The results for 10-Q filings are even stronger as tripling 
                                                          
13 In untabulated results, I also tried Big 6, Big 5 and Big 4 auditors and the results are robust. 
14 Words containing three or more syllables. 
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the number of words would result in more than 120 percentage change in odds of being litigated. 
In the case of 10-Qs, the ln (Average Words per Paragraph) is also positively associated with the 
risk of litigation, significant at the 1% level. Such stronger results make sense as it can be argued 
that the disclosure released in 10-Qs are more timely, proximate, frequent, and have been more 
recently updated. Such results are also robust to the inclusion of IBES control variables as 
presented in Appendix C.1. Overall, the multivariate results show a strong positive association 
between the degree of textual disclosure and the incidence of securities class action lawsuits, robust 
to different proxies of disclosure and various controls that have been used in the literature. 
 
5.1.2 Readability 
My next set of results answer the question whether there is an association between the 
difficulty level in readability, as measured by various readability indices, and the incidence of class 
action lawsuits. Note that readability is a different feature of textual analysis and is distinct from 
the degree of disclosure. Greater textual disclosure may not necessarily mean better readability. 
However, it can be argued that more readable 10-Ks and 10-Qs should be more informative to 
investors (Loughran and MacDonald, 2014; Hwang and Kim, 2017). As explained in the 
hypotheses development section, I conjecture a positive association between the incidence of 
litigation and readability difficulty. My empirical specification is as follows: 
Litigation Dummy i,t = β0 + δ * Readabilityi,t-1 + β1 * Xi,t + β2 * Xi,t-1 + εi,t          (2) 
The dependent variable, that is the litigation dummy, takes the value of 1 for the incidence 
of litigation, and 0 otherwise. The main independent variable in this specification is the readability 
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measure, which measures the level of difficulty in comprehending the intended message of the 
text. I construct and use seven different readability measures borrowed from the extant literature.15 
In this model, δ captures the effect of readability of the text used in 10-K and 10-Q filings on the 
probability of the firm being litigated. The results are shown in Table 5. There is a strong positive 
and significant association between the degree of difficulty measured by various readability 
indices and the probability of litigation. For example, in the second regression in Table 5 Panel A, 
where the main predictor variable is Flesch-Kincaid Readability Index, the coefficient is positive 
and statistically significant (t-statistic of 3.68). The negative sign of the coefficient of Flesch 
Reading Ease Index, which is opposite to the sign on coefficients of all the other readability 
indices, is because of the way it is measured. In case of Flesch Reading Ease Index, the higher the 
score, the easier the text is to read. For all the other indices, the higher the score, the more difficult 
the text is to read. Details on how these seven different indices have been created are provided in 
the Appendix B. All models include year and industry (2-digit SIC code) fixed effects, with 
standard errors clustered at the firm level and the same controls as used in the prior literature. 
These results, albeit a bit weaker in terms of significance levels in the case of 10-Ks, are also robust 
to the inclusion of analyst following and negative earnings surprises as shown in the Appendix 
C.2.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
                                                          
15 Flesch Reading Ease Index, Flesch-Kincaid Readability Index, RIX Readability Index, Gunning Fog Readability Index, 
Automated Readability Index, Smog Readability Index, and Lasbarhets Readability Index. 
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Such results indicate that readability of 10-K and 10-Q filings have significant predictive 
power in explaining the incidence of class action litigations. 
 
5.1.3 Sentiments 
My subsequent set of main results focuses on the influence of common sentiments 
generated by choice of words in the texts. I rely on prior literature to measure tone or sentiments 
of 10-Ks and 10-Qs. Using fourteen different commonly used sentiment measures as explained in 
variable definitions in Appendix B, I conduct the following test: 
 Litigation Dummy i,t = β0 + δ*Sentimentsi,t-1 + β1*Xi,t + β2*Xi,t-1 + εi,t          (3) 
In this empirical specification, my main covariate of interest is the measure of sentiments. 
The response variable is again a dummy variable indicating the incidence of litigation. The control 
variables are the same as used in the previous specifications. The results are shown in Table 6.1 
and Table 6.2. All models include year and industry (2-digit SIC code) fixed effects, with 
clustering done at the firm level. Standard errors have been reported in parentheses. In order to 
construct these sentiments variables, I have relied on two sources of word lists, namely, Loughran 
and McDonald’s (L-M) textual sentiments word lists and Harvard’s General Inquirer word list. 
Due to the high correlations (Appendix D) and word overlap in these lists, I run the above 
specification separately for each list.16 While Table 6.1 examines the link between the probability 
of being litigated and the various sentiment measures as a raw word count used in 10-Ks and 10-
                                                          
16 Loughran and McDonald (2013) also recommend running the regressions separately for each word list.  
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Qs respectively, Table 6.2 repeats the same regressions using word proportion or percentage as the 
main independent variables. 
[Insert Table 6.1 here] 
[Insert Table 6.2 here] 
Table 6.1 presents the relation between the sentiments generated, measured as a raw count 
and the probability of a firm being litigated. The first model shows a strong positive association 
between the use of uncertain words and the likelihood of being litigated. Loughran and 
McDonald’s uncertain word list contains words such as “ambiguity,” “anomalous,” “confusing,” 
“contingent,” etc., that signal indecision or lack of conviction. I find that the coefficient on the ln 
(uncertainty word count) is 0.580, which is significant at the 1% level. To put it differently, tripling 
the number of uncertainty words in 10-K filing results in more than 79% percentage increase in 
odds of being litigated, significant at the 1% level. Model 2, in Table 6.1 analyzes the influence of 
the use of weak modal words on the chances of being a target of litigators. Weak modal words are 
words such as “depending,” “possibly,” “sometimes,” “maybe,” etc., that are associated with 
management’s inability to have a clear vision, also significantly increase the probability of being 
litigated. The coefficient of interest on the ln (modal weak word count) is 0.527, significant at the 
1% level, which means that tripling the number of weak modal words used in 10-K filings would 
result in more than 69 percentage increase in odds of being litigated. Model 3 shows the results of 
using negative words, that is, words such as “fails,” “flaw,” “exaggeration,” “loss,” etc., that have 
a negative connotation also have a similar positive association with the incidence of securities class 
action lawsuits. The coefficient is 0.484, significant at the 1% level. It is possible that the negative 
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sentiments generated in the minds of shareholders with the use of negative words in 10-K filings 
are increasing the chances of being litigated. Such results are robust to using alternative word lists 
such as the Harvard negative word count, which also gives similar significant results as shown in 
model 7. In model 5, as expected, the use of litigious words, also significantly increases the chances 
of being litigated. Litigious words refer to words like “settlement,” “contracts,” “acquit,” 
“indemnify,” etc., that have a legal connotation. Model 5 documents that the coefficient on the ln 
(litigious word count) is 0.323, which is significant at the 1% level. In other words, simply tripling 
the number of litigious words in 10-K filing would result in more than 38 percentage change in 
odds of being litigated. However, surprisingly, the use of positive words, that arguably generate 
positive sentiments, also has a positive association with the likelihood of litigation as shown in 
model 4. Repeating the tests in the context of 10-Q filings in Table 6.1 (Panel B) yields similar 
significant results with larger effects. This is because 10-Qs are more frequently updated and 
contain more up-to-date information. 
Loughran and McDonald (2016) argue, “In most instances we do not want to use the raw 
count, since this is obviously strongly tied to document length.” (p.26). Therefore, in the next set 
of tests in Table 6.2, I use word proportions as suggested by Loughran and McDonald (2016) as a 
solution to this issue as the main covariate. The results are still significant with both 10-K and 10-
Q filings except for positive words where the sign flips and is only significant in the case of 10-
Qs. Such a result makes more sense as it can be argued that the greater the percentage of positive 
words used in the filings (that generate positive sentiments), the lesser are the chances of being 
litigated. More specifically, I find that in case of 10-Q filings, for each one percentage point 
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increase in the proportion of positive words, the log odds of being litigated (versus not-litigated) 
decreases by (39.918/100) % or 0.3992%, significant at the 5% level. Note that besides the 
opposite sign, both significance and magnitude of the coefficients for positive word proportion is 
less than the coefficients for negative word proportion which supports the view of asymmetric 
effects of positive and negative news as predicted by theoretical models such as Veronesi (1999) 
and Epstein and Schneider (2008) and empirically documented by both Tetlock (2007) and 
Loughran and McDonald (2011). People tend to be affected asymmetrically more by the negative 
news as compared to positive news.  
Finally, I test the robustness of these findings by including analyst following and negative 
earnings surprises in my regressions, and the results stay the same qualitatively as shown in 
Appendix C.3 and C.4. Overall, such statistically significant and economically meaningful results 
indicate that sentiment measures created by textual analytics have significant predictive power in 
explaining the incidence of shareholder class action litigations. 
 
5.1.4 Principal Component Analyses (PCA) 
Are the proxies used for measuring degree, readability, and sentiments accurately gauging 
the targeted characteristics of textual disclosure? To address this question, I employ principal 
component analysis (PCA), a statistical procedure, in which the idea is to extract the principal 
components from these proxies by reducing its dimensionality but retaining most of the variation 
in the original factors. It is akin to creating an index of the different proxies that are highly 
correlated, as is the case here (Appendix D), by retaining their uncorrelated and normalized 
components, using vector space transformation. 
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I extract the principal components from the seven proxies for the degree of textual 
disclosure and the seven proxies for readability of textual disclosure. For sentiments, I follow 
Loughran and McDonald (2013), and group uncertain, weak modal, and negative word proportion 
and count, as an ex-ante measure of uncertainty.  The results are reported in Table 7. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Note that such principal components not only enable me to capture the common essence of 
different textual variables, but it also improves the exposition of the results. The results are similar 
to the main results reported in the previous section. Table 7 shows that both in the case of 10-Ks 
(Panel A) and 10-Qs (Panel B) filings, the first component is highly significant in all the 
specifications (i.e., for degree of disclosure, readability, sentiments (count) and sentiments %) with 
higher correlations for the 10-Q filings, which is also consistent with the earlier results. The next 
set of tests explore the plausible impacts of textual disclosure in SEC filings on other aspects of 
shareholder class action litigations. 
 
5.2 Case Period 
The time between the case filing date and the settlement/dismissal date is defined as the 
“case period” or simply the time to the verdict. The “case period” is a function of several factors 
such as the severity and complexity of the alleged fraud, the quantity, and quality of the evidence, 
litigiousness of the industry and others. In this section, I ask whether textual disclosures in the 
filings have any association with the length of the “case period” after controlling for other factors. 
The idea here is that the text that is difficult to comprehend or is ambiguous will be likely to 
increase the “case period” and hence the costs to both the litigants and the defendants. 
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To formally test it for both 10-Ks and 10-Qs, I use OLS models with the dependent variable 
as the length of the “case period” in days and the principal components of either degree, readability, 
or sentiments of a firm’s textual disclosure as the main independent variable of interest. The results 
are presented in Table 8. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Panels A and B of Table 8 present the results for 10-K and 10-Q filings, respectively. All 
the eight models in Table 8 also control for size (natural logarithm of market value), return on 
assets (ROA), loss indicator (negative net income), earnings growth, sales growth, market-to-book, 
big-8 auditor dummy, lag size, lag ROA, lag loss indicator, lag stock volatility, lag stock return, 
and lag institutional ownership, besides year and industry (2-digit SIC code) fixed effects. The 
results show that there is a significant positive relation (significant at 1% level) between the use 
of words that proxy for ex-ante uncertainty (i.e., uncertain, weak modal, and negative word 
proportion and count) and the length of the “case period” for both 10-Ks and 10-Qs, as anticipated. 
Although there is no significant relation between the degree of disclosure and the length of the 
“case period,” readability is negatively associated with the length of the “case period,” (significant 
at the 10% level for 10-Qs), indicating that the use of text that is difficult to comprehend likely 
increases the length of the “case period.”     
 
5.3 Market Response 
In this section, I test the association between the degree, readability, and sentiments of a 
firm’s textual disclosure in 10-Ks and 10-Qs and the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around 
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the case filing date. The extant literature on litigation in corporate finance has used event study 
methodologies to determine the stock market reaction at the time of lawsuit filings. Several studies 
over the years such as Karpoff and Lott (1993), Bizjak and Coles (1995), Bhagat, Bizjak and Coles 
(1998), Gande and Lewis (2009) and most recently Klock (2015) have documented a significantly 
negative stock price reaction at the lawsuit filing date. Studies have attributed such stock price 
declines to reputational costs, increased probability of financial distress costs and higher chances 
of subsequent lawsuits. I confirm such negative cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the 
case filing date in my sample of securities class action lawsuits, and the results are presented in 
Table 9. 
 [Insert Table 9 here] 
The CARs have been computed as the difference between the actual stock price return and 
the expected market model (CRSP Value Weighted Index) return over the windows listed. Market 
model has been estimated using 255 days of daily returns ending 46 days before the case filing 
date. Note that in all the six different windows (days), the CARs are significantly negative. 
Furthermore, I ask if the association between textual disclosure in SEC filings and the likelihood 
of shareholder class action lawsuits is true, does the market perceive it as such? To formally answer 
this question, I run OLS regressions with cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the case 
filing date as a dependent variable, and the proxies of textual disclosure created a year prior to the 
case filing date as the main independent variable of interest. The regressions also control for size 
(natural logarithm of market value), return on assets (ROA), loss indicator (negative net income), 
earnings growth, sales growth, market-to-book, big-8 auditor dummy, lag size, lag ROA, lag loss 
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indicator, lag stock volatility, lag stock return, lag institutional ownership, and dummy indicating 
whether the litigation is either merger-related or accounting related. All models include year and 
industry (2-digit SIC code) fixed effects, with clustering at the firm level. Table 10 presents the 
results of such tests.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
For brevity, I only present the results showing the association between the principal 
components of degree, readability, and sentiments of a firm’s textual disclosure and the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) around the case filing date for CAR windows [-1, +1] and [-2, +2], using 
the market model. Panel A presents the results from analyses of firms’ 10-K filings, while Panel 
B provides the results from analyses of firms’ 10-Q filings. The results show that there is a 
significant negative relation between the use of words that proxy for ex-ante uncertainty (i.e., 
uncertain, weak modal, and negative word proportion and count) and market reaction on the 
lawsuit filing, indicating that the market also perceives the association between textual disclosure 
using words that proxy for ex-ante uncertainty in SEC filings and the likelihood of shareholder 
class action lawsuits. However, I do not find any significant results for either degree of disclosure 
or readability. A plausible reason for such results could be that often in shareholder litigations, the 
market becomes aware of the alleged fraud in stages rather than on one single day like the filing 
date or the class end date. So, the stock price reaction at the lawsuit filing date is muted to some 
extent.  
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5.4 Settlement Amount 
Approximately half of the cases in my sample of shareholder class action litigations are 
settled. Although there are many indirect costs of litigation such as reputational costs, loss of 
customers and suppliers, loss of management’s time, etc., that are hard to measure, one direct and 
measurable cost of litigation is the settlement disbursement. 
In this section, I explore the relation between textual disclosure in the texts of 10-Ks and 
10-Qs and the settlement amounts. I hand-collect the settlement amounts from various sources 
such as court documents, firm’s disclosures, and media articles. I further divide the settlements as 
a cash-only portion of the settlement and total settlement, which also includes the non-cash 
(securities) portion of the settlements. Then I scale the settlement amounts by the Disclosure Dollar 
Loss (DDL), which is the dollar value change in the litigated firm’s market capitalization between 
the trading day immediately prior to the class end date and the trading day immediately following 
the class end date.  
Following it, I repeat the main tests using the principal components of degree, readability, 
and sentiments of a firm’s textual disclosure as the main independent variables and the litigation 
settlement amount (cash amount and total amount) scaled by Disclosure Dollar Loss (DDL) as the 
dependent variables. So, the dependent variable can be thought of as a rough proxy for the recovery 
rate of the potential damages. Table 11 presents the results of such specification. 
[Insert Table 11] 
Panel A of Table 11 presents the results from the OLS models of 10-K filings, and Panel 
B repeats the same regressions for 10-Q filings. Note that only the coefficients on the Uncertainty 
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% are significantly negative. In other words, the use of higher proportion of words that proxy for 
uncertainty leads to lower recovery rates in settled cases. One plausible reason for such finding 
can be that, ex-post, the use of uncertain words in filings can also be used as an effective tool for 
defense from the defendant firm’s side. One common defense argument from a legal perspective 
that is often made in such cases is that uncertain words were used not to hide any material 
information but rather to make the investors aware of the potential risks.   
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6. A QUASI-NATURAL EXPERIMENT 
 
Crane and Koch (2018) provided evidence that in 1999, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
ruling, Re: Silicon Graphics Inc., led to an unexpected and sudden reduction in the threat of 
litigation for firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit that resulted in the number of shareholder 
class action lawsuits in the Ninth Circuit plunging 43% as compared to a 14% rise in other circuits. 
This ruling arguably made it harder for the shareholders of the firms located in the Ninth Circuit 
(i.e., the firms headquartered in the US states: Alaska, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, 
California, Nevada, Arizona, and Hawaii) to litigate firms in a shareholder class action lawsuit as 
it required the litigants to establish that the defendants acted with “deliberate recklessness.” Note 
that “deliberate recklessness” requires the plaintiffs to prove the “intent” of the defendant to cause 
harm to the shareholders’ wealth and is a stricter requirement than simply “recklessness.” 
Similar to Crane and Koch (2018), in this section I use the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
ruling, Re: Silicon Graphics Inc., as a quasi-natural experiment and an exogenous shock to the 
threat of litigation for firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit, as it is unlikely that the firms chose 
their headquarters in anticipation of this ruling. I conjecture that if the relation between textual 
disclosure and shareholder class action litigation documented in the earlier sections have a causal 
link, then one should expect that after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling, Re: Silicon 
Graphics Inc.,  firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit would disclose more in their 10-Ks and 
10-Qs, use a greater proportion of words that proxy for ex-ante measures of uncertainty, and their 
disclosures will be less readable relative to disclosures of firms across other circuits. This is 
39 
 
 
 
 
because the sudden reduction in the threat of litigation for the firms headquartered in the Ninth 
Circuit would allow them more flexibility and room to adjust their disclosure in response to such 
reduced shareholder litigation risk.  
To formally test such a hypothesis, I use the following difference-in-differences 
specification with year and firm fixed effects: 
        Textual Disclosure i,k,t = β0 + δ * Treatment k,t + β1 * Xi,t-1 + αi + αt + εi,k,t           
where,  Treatment = Post 1999 Dummy * Ninth Circuit Dummy 
The dependent variable in the specification above is the textual disclosure measure of either 
degree of disclosure, sentiments or readability. The subscripts i, k, and t indicate the firm i, location 
of the firm headquarters in state k, and time t, respectively. The main independent variable of 
interest is Treatment, which is an interaction of two dummies, i.e., whether it is pre- vs. post- 1999 
and whether the firm is headquartered in the Ninth Circuit (i.e., headquartered in the US states: 
Alaska, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, California, Nevada, Arizona, and Hawaii). Since 
Compustat only reports current headquarters location, I programmatically extract the information 
on historical headquarters of firms in 1998 from the header sections of the 10-Ks and 10-Qs. The 
specification also controls for other firm-level observable characteristics, Xi,t-1 and year (αt) and 
firm (αi) fixed effects to control for time-variant and time-invariant unobservable factors, 
respectively. The other observable firm-level characteristics include size (natural logarithm of 
market value), return on assets (ROA), earnings growth, sales growth, market-to-book, big-8 
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auditor dummy, stock volatility, and institutional ownership.17 Here the treated firms are the Ninth 
Circuit firms and the control firms are the non-Ninth Circuit firms exactly matched on years18 and 
industry (2-digit SIC code) and also matched on the closest estimated propensity score based on 
size (measured by market value) and market-to-book (M/B) ratio. The results are reported in Table 
12. 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
For brevity, I only present the results with Principal Component Analyses (PCA) for both 
10-K (Panel A) and 10-Q (Panel B) filings. As it can be seen from the coefficients on the 
interaction of Post 1999 Dummy x Ninth Circuit Dummy, firms in the Ninth Circuit significantly 
increase their use of words that proxy for ex-ante uncertainty (proxied with uncertain, weak modal, 
and negative word proportion and count) and their degree of textual disclosure (only for 10-Qs) 
after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling as compared to matched non-Ninth Circuit firms. 
The results for readability (untabulated) are not significantly different. One probable reason for 
this could be that institutional owners can systematically choose to own firms where it is more 
difficult for small shareholders to litigate them (Crane and Koch, 2018) and institutional owners 
demand more transparent disclosures from their investee firms as recently shown by Boone and 
White (2015) and Bird and Karolyi (2016).  
The next section conducts several robustness tests for the main results and addresses some 
of the concerns of endogeneity. 
                                                          
17 The results (untabulated) are also robust to the use of state-level macro variables such as state GDP, population, 
net tax receipts, and unemployment.  
18 I omit the year 1999 as the ruling occurred in the middle of 1999, and analyze three pre-years (1996, 1997, 1998) 
and three post-years (2000, 2001, 2002). 
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7. ENDOGENEITY CONCERNS AND ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 
In this section, I discuss the possible endogeneity concerns and perform a series of 
additional robustness tests to address some of them.  
It is likely that disclosure and the risk of litigation are endogenously determined. According 
to Roberts and Whited (2013), there are three specific sources of endogeneity: Simultaneity, 
measurement error, and omitted variables. This paper addresses all these three sources of 
endogeneity to some extent. The first source of endogeneity in this set-up is simultaneity or reverse 
causality. Here the main concern is that disclosure may not be causing class action litigations but 
instead, certain types of firms that are more likely to face litigations, disclose in a certain manner. 
I address this concern by creating textual disclosure variables from 10-Ks and 10-Qs, which were 
filed prior to the litigation filing date in all the specifications. Figure 1 presents the typical timeline 
of securities class action lawsuits and demonstrates the two empirical strategies used throughout 
the paper. Although I have used empirical strategy 1 for the results shown in the paper, in 
unreported analysis, I also replicate the main results by omitting the year of case filing and only 
analyzing the textual content of the filings a year before and after the case filing year to avoid the 
noise created in filings due to litigations as shown in empirical strategy 2. Also, the use of lagged 
covariates in all my empirical specifications and the use of the matched sample should mitigate 
such a concern to a certain extent. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
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The second source of endogeneity is measurement error which arises from discrepancies 
between the proxy used and the true value of the explanatory variable. In other words, the concern 
here is that we do not measure the true values of degree of textual disclosure, textual readability, 
and textual sentiments. The paper addresses this concern to a great degree by using seven different 
textual disclosure variables, seven different textual readability variables, fourteen different textual 
sentiments measures and two different and widely used sources of word lists in textual analysis 
from the extant literature. Moreover, I also use principal component analysis (PCA) to address this 
concern further as shown in the prior sections. 
The third source of endogeneity is omitted variable bias, where the argument is that there 
might be something unobservable which has not been included in the vector of covariates but 
might be driving both incidences of litigations and disclosure. Although I have tried to address this 
concern by including control variables used in prior literature and fixed effects, it is still possible 
that the results suffer from omitted variable bias. It is plausible that there is a third variable that 
affects both the textual content in SEC filings and litigation risk. One might also argue that 
complex or more litigious situations necessitate a certain type of disclosure. The following sub-
sections attempt to address some of these concerns. 
 
7.1 The Class Period (Alleged Damage Period) 
 In this section, I hypothesize that if there is a causal connection between the nature of 
disclosure and litigation risk, then it should also be indicated in the disclosure behavior, once the 
firms enter the “class period” or the alleged damage period. Hence, I ask whether something 
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changed in the nature of textual disclosure, once these firms enter the class period, after controlling 
for other numerical explanatory variables. More specifically, I ask, is that change different from 
the very similar firms that did not get litigated? 
To answer this question, I separate the sample into dismissed and settled cases and 
investigate the textual content of the filings for each sub-sample pre- vs. post-class start date using 
a standard difference-in-differences (DiD) framework and a matched sample. The empirical 
strategy is depicted in Figure 2. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
 And, the DiD specification used is shown below: 
Textual Variable i,t = β0 + β1*D(Litigated Firmi)*D(Post Class Start Datei,t) + β2*D(Post Class 
Start Datei,t) + β3*D(Litigated Firmi) + β*Xi,t + εi,t          (4) 
The predicted variable in the above DiD specification is one of the twenty-eight textual 
variables described before and the main coefficient of interest is β1, i.e., the coefficient on the 
interaction term. The results are reported in Tables 13.1 (degree of disclosure), 13.2 (readability), 
13.3 (sentiments) and 13.4 (sentiments%). 
[Insert Table 13.1 here] 
[Insert Table 13.2 here] 
[Insert Table 13.3 here] 
[Insert Table 13.4 here] 
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While panels A and C of these tables provide the results for 10-K filings, panels B and D 
show the results for 10-Q filings. As depicted in Table 13.1, the main coefficient of interest, β1 is 
negative and significant in most of the specifications for both 10-Ks and 10-Qs, indicating that the 
firms that have been litigated (both settled and dismissed) significantly reduce their degree of 
textual disclosure during the class period as compared to the matched sample. One likely 
interpretation of such results is that on average, rational managers of sued firms understand the 
causal relation between the degree of disclosure and the risk of litigation and try to intentionally 
reduce disclosure especially during the period when the (alleged) financial misconduct is being 
committed. However, as seen in the main results, such differential reduction in textual disclosure 
is not enough to prevent litigations.  
Following it, I test whether managers of sued firms improve the readability of their 
disclosures during the class period. The idea here is that if there is a causal connection between 
readability and litigation risk, rational managers will attempt to improve the readability of their 
disclosures, especially during the class period to deter litigation. The results are reported in Table 
13.2, where I find that there is a differential reduction in readability scores (i.e., improvement in 
readability), especially for the settled cases and 10-Qs. Note that I do not find significant results 
for the dismissed cases, though the signs of the coefficients are similar, probably because many of 
the dismissed cases are frivolous, to begin with.  
Finally, in Tables 13.3 and 13.4, I test whether managers of the litigated firms change the 
textual sentiments delineated in filings during the class period. As reported in table 8.3, I find that 
managers of the sued firms significantly reduce their use of uncertainty, weak modal, negative 
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(both Harvard and L&M), litigious words in both 10-K and 10-Q filings as compared to the 
matched firms post class start date. Such results are robust to the use of different controls and fixed 
effects and are similar for both settled and dismissed cases. Table 8.4 further confirms the results 
in terms of word proportions. Overall, the results in this section show that sued firms ex-ante 
change the nature of their textual disclosure during the class period in an attempt to deter 
litigations, indicating that there might be a causal connection between the nature of textual 
disclosure and litigation risk.     
 
7.2 Pre- vs. Post- Litigation Textual Analysis 
Following the empirical analyses above, I examine whether and how firms that are sued in 
securities class action lawsuits change their behavior regarding textual disclosure post-litigation. 
It is important to answer this question as it indicates how managers react in terms of textual 
disclosure after their experience of being litigated. It can be argued that if managers are rational 
and they perceive that greater textual disclosure or certain types of disclosure are triggering class 
action litigations, they would take steps to alter such disclosures post-litigation. It can also be 
argued that such possible changes in disclosure behavior post-litigation would differ for settled 
versus dismissed cases as managers of firms with settled class action lawsuits would perceive the 
cost-benefit analysis of disclosure differently from the managers of firms with dismissed cases, as 
the costs of settled cases are significantly higher than those of dismissed or frivolous cases.  
Therefore, I again divide the sample of sued firms into dismissed and settled cases and 
examine pre- vs. post-litigation textual content of each sub-sample using a standard difference-in-
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differences (DiD) framework. Matched control firms are selected as described earlier in the paper 
and the year of litigation is considered as the pseudo-event year for the matched firm in the DiD 
specification, as shown below: 
Textual Variable i,t = β0 + β1*D(Litigated Firmi)*D(Post Litigationi,t) + β2*D(Post Litigationi,t) 
+ β3*D(Litigated Firmi) + β*Xi,t + εi,t          (5) 
The dependent variable in the above DiD model is one of the twenty-eight textual variables 
that proxy for either degree of textual disclosure, readability or sentiments as described earlier in 
the paper. The main coefficient of interest on the right-hand side is β1, i.e., the coefficient on the 
interaction term where, D (Post Litigationi,t) is the dummy variable which is equal to one if the 
year is two-years post-litigation year and D (Litigated Firmi) is the dummy variable which is equal 
to one if the firm has been litigated. β1 denotes the differential change in textual variables for 
litigated firms pre- (i.e., two-years prior to the litigation year) and post- (i.e., two-years post- 
litigation year) litigation, compared to the matched sample. Focusing on  pre- and post- years 
enables this test to measure the impact of litigation on textual disclosure behavior without getting 
entangled in confounding events. Xi,t is a vector of control variables as described in earlier tests. I 
also include year and industry fixed effects, with clustering at the firm level. The results are 
reported in Tables 14.1, 14.2, 14.3 and 14.4. 
[Insert Table 14.1 here] 
[Insert Table 14.2 here] 
[Insert Table 14.3 here] 
[Insert Table 14.4 here] 
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While panels A and C provide the results for  10-Ks (for both settled and dismissed cases), 
panels B and D show the results for 10-Qs (for both settled and dismissed cases). If it is true that 
greater textual disclosure precipitates securities class action litigations, then one can expect that 
managers of the litigated firms would likely reduce disclosure post-litigation. We can see from 
Table 14.1 that the coefficient on the interaction term shows that there is a significant decrease in 
the degree of textual disclosure post-litigation. Also, such differential reduction in the textual 
disclosure variables is a lot higher in magnitude and significance for firms that were litigated, and 
there was a settlement. One interpretation of such a finding could be that since firms that settle 
bear significantly greater costs of litigation as compared to firms in which the cases were 
dismissed, the managers react more vigorously.  
In the case of readability variables (Table 14.2), the differential change is a lot weaker as 
most specifications indicate that there is no change pre- and post- litigation for both 
litigated/settled and litigated/dismissed cases suggesting that managers do not make readability 
significantly harder post-litigation as they probably learn on being sued, that there is a positive 
association between difficulty level in readability and incidence of litigation. Note that, one of the 
proxies of readability, i.e., Automated Readability Index (ARI) shows an increase in the difficulty 
level of readability. Such a result is surprising at first; however, sometimes, it could merely be a 
result of legally binding settlement clause to improve disclosure and explain a firm’s litigious 
situation, that might lead to higher readability scores. 
Finally, in the case of sentiment variables (Tables 14.3 and 14.4), I document that managers 
of the sued firms significantly reduce their use of uncertainty, weak modal, negative words (both 
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LM and Harvard) pre- and post- litigation for both the settled and dismissed cases. However, note 
that in the case of 10-Qs, that are more frequent and up-to-date, the proportion the use of negative 
and litigious words increases post litigation. This is puzzling because if the use of negative and 
litigious words increases the likelihood of being litigated as shown in prior tests, why do managers 
tend to increase the use of proportion of negative and litigious words post-litigation in their 10-
Qs? One probable explanation could be that managers tend to disclose bad news post-litigation to 
avoid litigation since they treat disclosure of bad news differently from the disclosure of good 
news. Such results are corroborated by Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005), who surveyed more 
than 400 executives and found that 76.8% of executives agree or strongly agree that disclosing bad 
news faster not only enhances their reputation for transparency but also reduces the risk of potential 
lawsuits. Moreover, a recent working paper, Billings, Cedergren and Dube (2016), also 
documented similar results when the authors found, “…our evidence indicates that the nature of 
disclosure matters: while managers reduce and delay their forecasts of positive news, bad news 
warnings actually increase and become more timely following litigation.” (p.31).  
Overall, the results presented in this section show that managers of the sued firms change 
the disclosure behavior in filings, post-litigation as compared to a matched sample, suggesting a 
causal connection between the nature of textual disclosure and litigation risk.     
  
 
 
 
49 
 
 
 
 
7.3 Largest Daily Stock Price Drop 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that shareholder litigations are often a result of a sharp stock 
price drop that grabs investor attention. Therefore, in the following empirical tests, I control for 
the largest daily stock price drop during the alleged damage period.  
Table 15 presents the relation between the principal components of degree, readability, and 
sentiments of a firm’s textual disclosure and the probability of the firm being litigated. While Panel 
A shows the results from analyses of firms’ 10K filings, Panel B presents the results from analyses 
of firms’ 10Q filings. All models control for size (natural logarithm of market value), return on 
assets (ROA), loss indicator (negative net income), earnings growth, sales growth, market-to-book, 
big-8 auditor dummy, lag size, lag ROA, lag loss indicator, lag stock volatility, lag stock return, 
lag institutional ownership, and the largest daily stock price drop during the alleged damage period. 
It is worth noting that although the largest daily stock return during the alleged damage period has 
an expected negative relation which is significant at the 1% level, the coefficients on the first 
components of disclosure, readability, and uncertainty (both count and %) stay qualitatively 
similar even after controlling for largest daily stock price drop.  
[Insert Table 15 here] 
 
7.4 Shareholder Class Action Litigation Type 
In this robustness sub-section, I explore if the results vary with the type of shareholder 
class action litigations. To test it formally, I manually read the First Identified Complaint (FIC) 
filings, other case documents, press releases and identify whether the litigations are: (1) Mergers 
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and Acquisitions (M&A) Related; or, (2) Disclosure Related. While M&A related litigations are 
filed when the litigant claims that there was a breach of fiduciary duty in relation to an M&A deal 
or tender offer, disclosure related litigations include, but are not limited to, alleged GAAP 
violations, misstatement of financial reports and other alleged material misrepresentations or 
omissions.  
[Insert Table 16 here] 
Table 16 shows that the main results stay qualitatively similar and are robust at 1% 
significance level, controlling for the type of litigation, both in the case of 10-K and 10-Q filings. 
Moreover, the coefficients on these litigation-type dummies are not significantly different from 
zero, indicating that the results are not driven by one specific type of litigation.  
 
7.5 Plain English Initiative 
The SEC published a guide titled, “A Plain English Handbook: How to Create Clear SEC 
Disclosure Documents,” in 1998 and implemented the Plain English Initiative in October 1998.19 
The idea behind this initiative of SEC was to make the disclosure documents such as 10-Ks and 
10-Qs more readable. Therefore, it can be argued that a part of the results on readability of 10-Ks 
and 10-Qs could be because of such a regulatory shock. 
To address such concerns, I split the sample pre- and post- Plain English Initiative in 
October 1998 and test the following specification on readability: 
                                                          
19 https://www.sec.gov/pdf/handbook.pdf 
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Litigation Dummy i,t = β0 + δ*Readabilityi,t-1* Post PEI + β1* Readabilityi,t-1+ β2* Post PEI + 
β*Xi,t + εi,t          (6) 
The results are reported in Table 17. 
[Insert Table 17 here] 
Two points can be noted here. First, the relation between readability and litigation risk 
documented in the main results holds both pre- and post- Plain English Initiative. Second, the 
coefficient of the interaction term, i.e., δ shows that the relation weakens post- Plain English 
Initiative as this regulatory shock is supposed to standardize the readability of disclosure 
documents.  
 
7.6 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) 
The 2002 adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) coerced publicly listed firms to 
have greater transparency (Cohen, Dey and Lys, 2005), enhanced disclosure (Beneish, Billings 
and Hodder, 2008) and discouraged risk-taking (Bargeron, Lehn and Zutter, 2010) by increasing 
the likelihood and severity of punishment on fraudulent and misleading disclosures. Hence, one 
potential concern is that the main results could be driven by the adoption of SOX on July 30, 2002. 
To address such a concern, I split the sample pre- and post- SOX and test the following 
specification on the degree of textual disclosure: 
Litigation Dummy i,t = β0 + δ*Disclosurei,t-1* Post SOX + β1* Disclosurei,t-1+ β2* Post SOX + 
β*Xi,t + εi,t          (7) 
The results are reported in Table 18. 
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[Insert Table 18 here] 
The results presented in Table 18 not only indicate that the relation between the degree of 
disclosure and litigation risk documented in the main results holds both pre- and post- SOX but 
also shows that such relation weakens post-SOX (especially for 10-Qs) as SOX standardized the 
degree of disclosure in filings to a great extent. 
 
7.7 Other Tests 
I conduct several other robustness tests (untabulated) that further corroborate my main 
results. A disproportionate amount of securities litigations occurs in the business services 
(particularly, technology firms) and chemicals and allied products (notably, pharmaceutical 
companies). I have tried to address this using industry fixed effects in all my specifications 
(Gormley and Matsa, 2014) and I also find that the (untabulated) results stay qualitatively 
consistent when I exclude industries with a high number of litigations.20 
Finally, I conduct falsification tests (unreported) by repeating difference-in-differences 
(DiD) analyses two years prior to the class start date and two years before the litigation filing date 
by falsely assuming these dates two years before their actual dates, and do not find any significant 
results, which reinforces the difference-in-differences (DiD) results. 
 
  
                                                          
20 The results are robust to the exclusion of high litigation risk industries, both at two SIC digit code level (73,28,36,35 
& 38) and more granular four SIC digit code level (Computers, 3570-3577 and 7370-7374; Electronics, 3600-3674; 
2833-2836 etc.). 
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8. CONCLUSION 
 
Employing well-established big data text analytics techniques, I study the relation between 
non-numeric textual disclosure in the narratives of SEC filings, and litigation risk after controlling 
for explanatory numerical variables. Using degree of textual disclosure, readability of disclosures 
and sentiments generated through the choice of words used in 10-Ks and 10-Qs, and matched 
sample, I find that greater textual disclosure, readability or comprehensibility of texts used and 
sentiments produced through the choice of words have a significant predictive power in explaining 
the likelihood of being sued by shareholders in class actions. While I find that more disclosure 
through texts in filings and the difficulty level of comprehending text used in filings increases the 
risk of litigation, this paper also shows that it is not just the degree of textual disclosure but also 
the sentiments portrayed in disclosures that are associated with the incidence of shareholder class 
action litigations. For instance, the use of words that generate negative sentiments such as 
uncertainty words, weak modal words, litigious words and words having negative connotations in 
10-K and 10-Q filings increase the likelihood of being litigated.  
Finally, I show how managers alter their behavior with respect to textual disclosures pre- 
and post-class start date and pre- versus post-litigation using a standard difference-in-differences 
(DiD) framework. These results are robust to the use of different controls, matched sample and 
empirical specifications, including principal component analysis (PCA) and a quasi-natural 
experiment that address several concerns of endogeneity. Overall, the results presented in the paper 
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demonstrate that there is a need to recognize the difference between merely more versus better 
disclosure.  
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Figure 1. Timeline of Shareholder Class Action Lawsuits and the Empirical Strategies 1 and 2 
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Figure 2. Timeline of Shareholder Class Action Lawsuits and the Empirical Strategy 3 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics on Litigation 
This table summarizes the number of litigations filed each year from 1996-2014 in my sample (Panel A) 
and the status of those litigation cases (Panel B). Panel C reports the summary statistics on the case period 
and class period for the cases, and total settlement amount for those cases that are settled. Total Settlement 
Amount includes both the cash amount and noncash amount.  
 
Panel A: 
No of litigations from 1996-2014 
Panel B:  
No of litigations by Status 
 
 
 
 
Case Status 
No. of 
Litigations 
Active 133 
Dismissed 917 
Settled (including Adjudicated at Trial) 1285 
Total 2,335 
 
 
Panel C: Case Period, Class Period and Settlement Amount of Litigations 
  Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Case Period (days) 1,157 907 856 1 5,036 
Class Period (days) 506 365 493 1 5,513 
Settlement Amount $28,238,076 $5,000,000 $149,955,942 $37,500 $3,200,000,000 
 
Year No. of Litigations
1996 73
1997 121
1998 160
1999 158
2000 136
2001 331
2002 150
2003 140
2004 160
2005 127
2006 79
2007 106
2008 110
2009 82
2010 95
2011 86
2012 83
2013 107
2014 31
Total 2,335
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Table 2 Matched Sample – Covariate Balance 
The table reports the summary statistics for the independent variables used in my analysis for both “treated” (litigated firms) and “control” (non-
litigated firms) sample. The last column reports the p-value of the mean differences. Variable definitions are included in Appendix B. 
 
 
  
Differences
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. N Mean Median Std. Dev. p-value
Size (Market Cap) 2,137 6,897.93 425.46 24,432.93 2,137 5,963.89 437.95 24,673.48 0.2138
Return on Assets (ROA) 2,137 -32.87% -1.75% 236.11% 2,137 -83.18% -0.96% 3247.86% 0.4752
Earnings Growth 2,137 23.31% -1.49% 1365.89% 2,137 45.81% -0.21% 2231.36% 0.6910
Sales Growth 2,137 128.03% 105.03% 267.81% 2,137 122.93% 106.21% 140.16% 0.4356
Loss Indicator 2,137 0.56 1.00 0.50 2,137 0.57 1.00 0.49 0.3085
Market-to-Book 2,069 2.46 1.60 8.26 2,072 3.96 1.66 51.72 0.1921
Stock Return 2,070 1.12 0.93 1.22 2,072 1.13 1.73 0.89 0.7953
Institutional Ownership 2,070 39.59% 36.62% 36.47% 2,072 37.84% 34.24% 35.62% 0.1193
Negative Earnings Surprise 1,092 0.66 1.00 0.47 1,092 0.66 1.00 0.47 0.8213
No. of Analyst Following 1,092 16.20 14.00 10.33 1,092 15.64 13.00 10.73 0.2129
Firms litigated Firms not litigated
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics on Textual Analysis variables for Litigated vs. Non-litigated Firms (10K) 
This table reports the univariate comparisons in disclosure, readability, and sentiment in 10K (and its variants) filings between litigated firms and 
their matched non-litigated firms. The last column reports the p-value of the differences. Variable definitions are included in Appendix B.  
 
 
* For Flesch Reading Ease Index, the higher is the value, the lower is the degree of difficulty in understanding the intended message of the text. 
Panel A: Disclosure Variables
Differences
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. N Mean Median Std. Dev. p-value
File Size 1,929 4,144,937.00 1,178,344.00 9,456,263.00 1,929 4,378,273.00 1,218,502.00 8,991,052.00 0.4323
Word Count 1,928 43,390.69 35,643.00 35,271.02 1,929 38,562.74 33,351.00 27,688.19 < 0.0000
Complex word count 1,928 11,026.50 9,089.00 8,468.44 1,929 9,803.02 8,485.00 6,861.20 < 0.0000
Sentence count 1,928 1,700.51 1,473.50 1,103.03 1,929 1,534.13 1,378.00 964.69 < 0.0000
Paragraph Count 1,928 571.82 486.00 413.44 1,929 514.18 455.00 308.52 < 0.0000
Average No. of words per sentence 1,928 24.74 24.33 2.79 1,929 24.53 24.22 2.76 0.0191
Average No. of words per paragraph 1,928 229.52 71.02 4,090.52 1,929 162.16 70.12 1,920.71 0.5128
Panel B: Readability Variables
Differences
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. N Mean Median Std. Dev. p-value
Flesch Reading Ease Index * 1,928 24.84 24.82 3.61 1,929 25.66 25.46 3.96 < 0.0000
Flesch-Kincaid Readability Index 1,928 15.94 15.83 1.05 1,929 15.77 15.73 1.08 < 0.0000
RIX Readability Index 1,928 8.92 8.83 0.88 1,929 8.77 8.73 0.88 < 0.0000
Gunning Fog Readability Index 1,928 20.14 20.03 1.11 1,929 20.03 19.98 1.11 0.0015
Automated Readability Index (ARI) 1,928 22.53 22.33 1.33 1,929 22.40 22.27 1.28 0.0019
Smog Readability Index 1,928 17.48 17.42 0.76 1,929 17.40 17.38 0.77 0.0008
LIX Readability Index 1,928 60.86 60.68 2.65 1,929 60.37 60.35 2.71 < 0.0000
Panel C: Sentiment Variables (%)
Differences
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. N Mean Median Std. Dev. p-value
LM Negative Word (%) 1,928 1.74% 1.72% 0.52% 1,929 1.61% 1.59% 0.53% < 0.0000
LM Positive Word (%) 1,928 0.82% 0.80% 0.19% 1,929 0.81% 0.79% 0.20% 0.0370
LM Modal Weak Word (%) 1,928 0.60% 0.58% 0.24% 1,929 0.56% 0.54% 0.24% < 0.0000
LM Litigious Word (%) 1,928 1.13% 0.97% 0.57% 1,929 1.09% 0.90% 0.62% 0.0279
LM Uncertainty Word (%) 1,928 1.46% 1.47% 0.34% 1,929 1.40% 1.42% 0.35% < 0.0000
LM Modal Strong Word (%) 1,928 0.32% 0.30% 0.11% 1,929 0.30% 0.28% 0.11% < 0.0000
Harvard Negative Word (%) 1,928 3.99% 3.99% 0.65% 1,929 3.96% 3.99% 0.68% 0.1541
Panel D: Sentiment Variables (Count)
Differences
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. N Mean Median Std. Dev. p-value
LM Negative Word (Count) 1,928 723.74 572.50 662.02 1,929 605.44 491.00 530.66 < 0.0000
LM Positive Word (Count) 1,928 315.23 267.00 229.80 1,929 280.39 251.00 194.20 < 0.0000
LM Modal Weak Word (Count) 1,928 237.20 206.50 180.30 1,929 205.19 175.00 156.46 < 0.0000
LM Litigious Word (Count) 1,928 505.73 312.00 831.93 1,929 418.60 270.00 603.30 0.0002
LM Uncertainty Word (Count) 1,928 570.51 497.00 412.27 1,929 500.90 442.00 352.84 < 0.0000
LM Modal Strong Word (Count) 1,928 122.77 103.00 111.11 1,929 104.66 89.00 80.14 < 0.0000
Harvard Negative Word (Count) 1,928 1,599.43 1,312.00 1,265.92 1,929 1,423.41 1,233.00 1,077.84 < 0.0000
Firms litigated Firms not litigated
Firms litigated Firms not litigated
Firms litigated Firms not litigated
Firms litigated Firms not litigated
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Table 3.2 Summary Statistics on Textual Analysis variables for Litigated vs. Non-litigated Firms (10Q) 
This table reports the univariate comparisons in disclosure, readability, and sentiment in 10Q (and its variants) filings between litigated firms and 
their matched non-litigated firms. The last column reports the p-value of the differences. Variable definitions are included in Appendix B. 
 
 
* For Flesch Reading Ease Index, the higher is the value, the lower is the degree of difficulty in understanding the intended message of the text. 
Panel A: Disclosure Variables
Differences
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. N Mean Median Std. Dev. p-value
File Size 2,137 1,963,734.00 421,818.70 5,090,269.00 2,137 1,960,586.00 389,034.30 4,838,285.00 0.9835
Word Count 2,137 15,674.84 12,571.33 14,129.99 2,136 12,625.94 10,329.33 9,593.17 < 0.0000
Complex word count 2,137 3,830.94 3,081.67 3,382.03 2,136 3,071.43 2,467.17 2,386.53 < 0.0000
Sentence count 2,137 597.84 502.33 455.97 2,136 490.76 420.00 341.17 < 0.0000
Paragraph Count 2,137 200.33 164.00 169.29 2,136 165.93 137.67 114.30 < 0.0000
Average No. of words per sentence 2,137 25.37 25.15 2.49 2,136 24.91 24.86 2.76 < 0.0000
Average No. of words per paragraph 2,137 129.15 73.46 1,089.78 2,136 133.58 70.41 1,213.55 0.9001
Panel B: Readability Variables
Differences
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. N Mean Median Std. Dev. p-value
Flesch Reading Ease Index * 2,137 26.90 26.55 4.31 2,136 28.33 28.15 5.02 < 0.0000
Flesch-Kincaid Readability Index 2,137 15.81 15.79 1.08 2,136 15.50 15.52 1.25 < 0.0000
RIX Readability Index 2,137 8.96 8.90 0.88 2,136 8.72 8.70 1.00 < 0.0000
Gunning Fog Readability Index 2,137 19.91 19.87 1.17 2,136 19.62 19.64 1.32 < 0.0000
Automated Readability Index (ARI) 2,137 22.67 22.54 1.31 2,136 22.48 22.39 1.42 < 0.0000
Smog Readability Index 2,137 17.31 17.30 0.81 2,136 17.10 17.13 0.92 < 0.0000
LIX Readability Index 2,137 60.73 60.61 2.73 2,136 59.95 59.85 3.08 < 0.0000
Panel C: Sentiment Variables (%)
Differences
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. N Mean Median Std. Dev. p-value
LM Negative Word (%) 2,137 2.04% 1.95% 0.80% 2,136 1.63% 1.50% 0.72% < 0.0000
LM Positive Word (%) 2,137 0.73% 0.71% 0.22% 2,136 0.73% 0.70% 0.24% 0.5640
LM Modal Weak Word (%) 2,137 0.60% 0.45% 0.40% 2,136 0.50% 0.39% 0.34% < 0.0000
LM Litigious Word (%) 2,137 1.17% 1.01% 0.62% 2,136 0.97% 0.81% 0.60% < 0.0000
LM Uncertainty Word (%) 2,137 1.56% 1.48% 0.50% 2,136 1.40% 1.33% 0.48% < 0.0000
LM Modal Strong Word (%) 2,137 0.32% 0.30% 0.14% 2,136 0.29% 0.27% 0.14% < 0.0000
Harvard Negative Word (%) 2,137 4.31% 4.27% 0.77% 2,136 4.04% 4.02% 0.81% < 0.0000
Panel D: Sentiment Variables (Count)
Differences
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. N Mean Median Std. Dev. p-value
LM Negative Word (Count) 2,137 311.17 230.33 308.78 2,136 214.07 140.50 226.29 < 0.0000
LM Positive Word (Count) 2,137 105.77 85.00 94.00 2,136 86.85 66.33 77.50 < 0.0000
LM Modal Weak Word (Count) 2,137 91.14 54.67 94.46 2,136 66.26 36.00 82.63 < 0.0000
LM Litigious Word (Count) 2,137 188.19 118.00 302.16 2,136 129.58 78.00 185.01 < 0.0000
LM Uncertainty Word (Count) 2,137 225.50 174.33 190.41 2,136 171.83 125.50 156.86 < 0.0000
LM Modal Strong Word (Count) 2,137 45.29 35.00 41.09 2,136 34.47 26.00 31.86 < 0.0000
Harvard Negative Word (Count) 2,137 625.14 501.33 549.21 2,136 483.08 373.33 407.44 < 0.0000
Firms litigated Firms not litigated
Firms litigated Firms not litigated
Firms litigated Firms not litigated
Firms litigated Firms not litigated
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Table 4 Disclosure and Litigation – 10K and 10Q Filings 
The table shows the association between disclosure by a firm (using seven different measures) and the probability of the firm being litigated. Panel 
A has the results from analysis of firms’ 10K filings, while Panel B has the results from analysis of firms’ 10Q filings. All models control for size 
(natural logarithm of market value), return on assets (ROA), loss indicator (negative net income), earnings growth, sales growth, market-to-book, 
big-8 auditor dummy, lag size, lag ROA, lag loss indicator, lag stock volatility, lag stock return, and lag institutional ownership. All models include 
year and industry (2-digit SIC code) fixed effects, with clustering at the firm level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Variable definitions are explained in Appendix B. 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation
LN (File Size) 0.152*** 0.310***
(0.058) (0.050)
LN (Word Count) 0.463*** 0.791***
(0.090) (0.078)
LN (Complex Word Count) 0.501*** 0.792***
(0.094) (0.076)
LN (Sentence Count) 0.510*** 0.827***
(0.101) (0.084)
LN (Average Words per Sentence) 0.995*** 2.236***
(0.357) (0.362)
LN (Paragraph Count) 0.311*** 0.580***
(0.095) (0.097)
LN (Average Words per Paragraph) 0.125 0.312***
(0.101) (0.119)
Constant -4.241*** -6.656*** -6.283*** -5.508*** -5.425*** -3.960*** -2.834*** -5.187*** -7.865*** -6.685*** -5.551*** -9.062*** -4.023*** -3.356***
(1.187) (1.307) (1.245) (1.177) (1.511) (1.122) (1.085) (0.706) (0.747) (0.653) (0.595) (1.224) (0.586) (0.662)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732 4193 4193 4193 4193 4193 4193 4193
Pseudo R-squared 0.140 0.145 0.145 0.144 0.140 0.142 0.139 0.141 0.155 0.156 0.153 0.141 0.145 0.137
Panel A: 10K Filings (Litigation Logit Model) Panel B: 10Q Filings (Litigation Logit Model)
Variables
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Table 5 Readability and Litigation – 10K and 10Q Filings 
The table shows the association between readability of a firm’s filings (using seven different measures) and the probability of the firm being litigated. 
Panel A has the results from analysis of firms’ 10K filings, while Panel B has the results from analysis of firms’ 10Q filings. All models control for 
size (natural logarithm of market value), return on assets (ROA), loss indicator (negative net income), earnings growth, sales growth, market-to-
book, big-8 auditor dummy, lag size, lag ROA, lag loss indicator, lag stock volatility, lag stock return, and lag institutional ownership. All models 
include year and industry (2-digit SIC code) fixed effects, with clustering at the firm level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Variable definitions are explained in Appendix B. 
 
 
 
 
* For Flesch Reading Ease Index, the higher is the value, the lower is the degree of difficulty in understanding the intended message of the text. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation
Automated Readability Index (ARI) 0.047* 0.091***
(0.027) (0.025)
Flesch-Kincaid Readability Index 0.136*** 0.260***
(0.037) (0.035)
Gunning Fog Readability 0.102*** 0.216***
(0.034) (0.031)
Smog Readability Index 0.158*** 0.323***
(0.050) (0.044)
Flesch Reading Ease Index -0.050*** -0.071***
(0.011) (0.009)
LIX Readability Index 0.054*** 0.083***
(0.014) (0.013)
RIX Readability Index 0.159*** 0.262***
(0.043) (0.040)
Constant -3.313*** -4.231*** -4.198*** -4.878*** -0.584 -5.369*** -3.512*** -4.112*** -5.631*** -5.987*** -7.238*** 0.605 -6.760*** -4.084***
(1.159) (1.148) (1.190) (1.296) (1.101) (1.301) (1.076) (0.748) (0.676) (0.740) (0.858) (0.579) (0.879) (0.570)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732 4193 4193 4193 4193 4193 4193 4193
Pseudo R-squared 0.139 0.141 0.140 0.140 0.142 0.141 0.141 0.137 0.145 0.143 0.144 0.146 0.142 0.142
Panel A: 10K Filings (Litigation Logit Model) Panel B: 10Q Filings (Litigation Logit Model)
Variables
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Table 6.1 Sentiment (Count) and Litigation – 10K and 10Q Filings 
The table shows the association between sentiment of a firm’s filings (measured by count) and the probability of the firm being litigated. Panel A 
has the results from analysis of firms’ 10K filings, while Panel B has the results from analysis of firms’ 10Q filings. All models control for size 
(natural logarithm of market value), return on assets (ROA), loss indicator (negative net income), earnings growth, sales growth, market-to-book, 
big-8 auditor dummy, lag size, lag ROA, lag loss indicator, lag stock volatility, lag stock return, and lag institutional ownership. All models include 
year and industry (2-digit SIC code) fixed effects, with clustering at the firm level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Variable definitions are explained in Appendix B. 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation
LN (Uncertainty Word Count) 0.580*** 0.634***
(0.088) (0.057)
LN (Modal Weak Word Count) 0.527*** 0.387***
(0.067) (0.041)
LN (Negative Word Count) 0.484*** 0.658***
(0.069) (0.050)
LN (Positive Word Count) 0.366*** 0.464***
(0.077) (0.059)
LN (Litigious Word Count) 0.323*** 0.581***
(0.059) (0.047)
LN (Modal Strong Word Count) 0.431*** 0.484***
(0.065) (0.049)
LN (Harvard Negative Word Count) 0.449*** 0.751***
(0.084) (0.068)
Constant -4.883*** -3.971*** -4.516*** -3.894*** -3.739*** -3.865*** -4.875*** -3.420*** -2.344*** -3.661*** -2.960*** -3.480*** -2.363*** -4.926***
(1.082) (1.019) (1.099) (1.062) (1.043) (1.060) (1.125) (0.500) (0.491) (0.504) (0.501) (0.502) (0.489) (0.552)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 3732 3730 3732 3732 3732 3731 3732 4192 4191 4193 4193 4193 4187 4193
Pseudo R-squared 0.150 0.152 0.150 0.143 0.145 0.147 0.145 0.157 0.151 0.168 0.146 0.166 0.153 0.158
Panel A: 10K Filings (Litigation Logit Model) Panel B: 10Q Filings (Litigation Logit Model)
Variables
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Table 6.2 Sentiment (%) and Litigation – 10K and 10Q Filings 
The table shows the association between sentiment of a firm’s filings (measured by percentage) and the probability of the firm being litigated. Panel 
A has the results from analysis of firms’ 10K filings, while Panel B has the results from analysis of firms’ 10Q filings. All models control for size 
(natural logarithm of market value), return on assets (ROA), loss indicator (negative net income), earnings growth, sales growth, market-to-book, 
big-8 auditor dummy, lag size, lag ROA, lag loss indicator, lag stock volatility, lag stock return, and lag institutional ownership. All models include 
year and industry (2-digit SIC code) fixed effects, with clustering at the firm level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Variable definitions are explained in Appendix B. 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation
Uncertainty Word Proportion 65.656*** 41.290***
(14.387) (8.190)
Modal Weak Word Proportion 116.855*** 50.508***
(22.684) (11.232)
Negative Word Proportion 57.946*** 56.498***
(8.786) (5.337)
Positive Word Proportion -14.859 -39.918**
(19.331) (17.056)
Litigious Word Proportion 13.668* 51.871***
(6.977) (6.573)
Modal Strong Word Proportion 132.997*** 136.683***
(38.484) (29.820)
Harvard Negative Word Proportion 13.708** 25.689***
(6.543) (4.993)
Constant -2.837*** -2.545** -2.828*** -2.218** -2.436** -2.805*** -2.716*** -2.336*** -2.121*** -2.591*** -1.903*** -2.635*** -2.348*** -3.016***
(1.002) (1.000) (1.069) (1.012) (1.005) (1.032) (1.031) (0.482) (0.485) (0.489) (0.489) (0.486) (0.488) (0.527)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732 4193 4193 4193 4193 4193 4193 4193
Pseudo R-squared 0.143 0.145 0.147 0.138 0.139 0.141 0.139 0.139 0.139 0.157 0.136 0.147 0.139 0.139
Panel A: 10K Filings (Litigation Logit Model) Panel B: 10Q Filings (Litigation Logit Model)
Variables
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Table 7: Principal Component Analysis – Litigation Risk 
The table shows the association between the principal components of degree, readability, and sentiments of a firm’s textual disclosure and the 
probability of the firm being litigated. Panel A has the results from analysis of firms’ 10K filings, while Panel B has the results from analysis of 
firms’ 10Q filings. All models control for size (natural logarithm of market value), return on assets (ROA), loss indicator (negative net income), 
earnings growth, sales growth, market-to-book, big-8 auditor dummy, lag size, lag ROA, lag loss indicator, lag stock volatility, lag stock return, and 
lag institutional ownership. All models include year and industry (2-digit SIC code) fixed effects, with clustering at the firm level. Standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Variable definitions are explained in Appendix B. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables D_litigation D_litigation D_litigation D_litigation D_litigation D_litigation D_litigation D_litigation
Disclosure (PCA) 0.140*** 0.280***
(0.027) (0.028)
Readability (PCA) 0.053*** 0.103***
(0.016) (0.016)
Uncertainty % (PCA) 0.204*** 0.214***
(0.033) (0.026)
Uncertainty Count (PCA) 0.163*** 0.188***
(0.036) (0.028)
Constant -1.803* -2.126** -1.656 -1.692 -0.413 -1.747*** -1.496*** -1.283**
(1.019) (1.025) (1.030) (1.034) (0.517) (0.489) (0.494) (0.500)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 3732 3732 3732 3732 4095 4095 4095 4095
Pseudo R-squared 0.145 0.140 0.147 0.145 0.156 0.143 0.148 0.146
Panel A: 10K Filings (Logit Model) Panel B: 10Q Filings (Logit Model)
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Table 8: Principal Component Analysis – Case Period 
The table shows the association between the principal components of degree, readability, and sentiments 
of a firm’s textual disclosure and the length of case period in days (the difference between the case end date 
and the case filing date). Panel A has the results from analysis of firms’ 10K filings, while Panel B has the 
results from analysis of firms’ 10Q filings. All models control for size (natural logarithm of market value), 
return on assets (ROA), loss indicator (negative net income), earnings growth, sales growth, market-to-
book, big-8 auditor dummy, lag size, lag ROA, lag loss indicator, lag stock volatility, lag stock return, and 
lag institutional ownership. All models include year and industry (2-digit SIC code) fixed effects, with 
clustering at the firm level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Variable definitions are explained in Appendix B. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables
Disclosure (PCA) 8.387 15.885
(11.655) (12.520)
Readability (PCA) -10.599 -11.813*
(7.457) (7.108)
Uncertainty % (PCA) 39.673*** 35.622***
(14.758) (12.485)
Uncertainty Count (PCA) 10.485 8.705
(9.582) (10.210)
Size (ln_MV) -17.873 -18.259 -17.271 -17.849 11.511 10.568 12.984 11.401
(18.812) (18.830) (18.697) (18.789) (18.880) (18.912) (18.691) (18.889)
ROA -3.866 -3.688 -5.507 -4.059 0.031 0.215 -0.959 -0.125
(13.255) (13.276) (12.301) (13.198) (9.092) (9.226) (9.396) (9.239)
Earnings Growth 22.990 23.941 20.471 22.756 1.599*** 1.697*** 1.608*** 1.620***
(25.268) (25.127) (24.910) (25.243) (0.314) (0.317) (0.314) (0.316)
Sales Growth -2.271 -2.474 -1.918 -2.228 -1.594 -1.890 -0.818 -1.623
(2.507) (2.621) (2.301) (2.489) (2.615) (2.799) (2.668) (2.680)
Loss Indicator 112.330*** 114.920*** 102.315** 111.956*** 128.286*** 136.702*** 124.504*** 130.876***
(43.376) (43.013) (43.253) (43.247) (42.021) (41.421) (41.888) (41.978)
Lag Size (ln_MV) 80.259*** 83.893*** 81.038*** 80.058*** 40.916* 48.618** 41.458* 43.575**
(22.852) (22.630) (22.469) (22.882) (22.306) (21.913) (21.746) (22.149)
Lag_Market-to-Book -0.429 -0.435 -0.196 -0.422 -1.791 -1.879 -1.934 -1.872
(1.118) (1.113) (1.115) (1.115) (1.617) (1.728) (1.616) (1.663)
Lag_Volatility 41.241 33.725 24.487 39.045 44.661 42.020 32.817 43.594
(52.701) (52.846) (51.557) (52.589) (46.044) (47.270) (45.923) (46.584)
Lag_Return on Assets (ROA) -1.956 -2.561 -1.875 -1.947 -4.747 -5.738 -5.001 -5.039
(9.949) (9.960) (9.227) (9.905) (6.928) (7.008) (7.133) (7.026)
Lag_Loss Indicator 73.964 81.855* 66.293 73.017 31.738 45.780 24.543 34.719
(45.216) (45.393) (45.712) (45.548) (43.658) (43.195) (43.353) (43.842)
Stock Return -61.969*** -63.240*** -62.636*** -62.229*** -71.356*** -73.309*** -70.919*** -72.184***
(16.944) (17.115) (16.687) (16.917) (15.319) (15.559) (14.741) (15.401)
Big-8 Auditor -83.084 -79.306 -89.143* -83.935 -79.184 -71.183 -87.100* -77.530
(52.028) (52.013) (51.453) (52.092) (48.708) (48.553) (48.690) (48.967)
Institutional Ownership -41.599 -45.698 -52.481 -42.067 -77.180 -82.499 -89.207* -79.666
(55.690) (55.788) (56.115) (55.668) (53.332) (53.222) (53.657) (53.185)
Constant 366.714 319.850 490.396* 383.675 593.560** 452.750** 631.469*** 552.334**
(283.927) (287.001) (290.593) (285.779) (231.643) (224.062) (228.040) (230.005)
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1625 1625 1625 1625 1833 1833 1833 1833
Pseudo R-squared 0.324 0.324 0.327 0.324 0.355 0.355 0.358 0.354
Panel A: 10K Filings (OLS Model) Panel B: 10Q Filings (OLS Model)
Case Period (days) Case Period (days)
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Table 9: Event Study on Case Filing Date 
Table presents the mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the case filing date for six different event windows (days): (-30, -2), (-1, +1), 
-2, +2), (0, 0), (0, +1), and (0, +2). All CARs are computed as the difference between the actual stock price return and the expected market model 
(CRSP Value Weighted Index) return over the windows listed. Market model has been estimated using 255 days of daily returns ending 46 days 
prior to the case filing date. The table also reports both the Patell Z-statistic and the corresponding p-value. 
 
  
Windows (days) N Mean CAR Patell Z p-value
(-30, -2) 1888 -13.06% -35.995 <.0001
(-1, +1) 1871 -4.14% -30.866 <.0001
(-2, +2) 1874 -5.92% -35.131 <.0001
(0, 0) 1867 -1.42% -18.164 <.0001
(0, +1) 1867 -2.27% -18.321 <.0001
(0, +2) 1867 -2.85% -18.851 <.0001
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Table 10: Principal Component Analysis – Market Response 
The table shows the association between the principal components of degree, readability, and sentiments of a firm’s textual disclosure and the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the case filing date. Panel A has the results from analysis of firms’ 10K filings, while Panel B has the 
results from analysis of firms’ 10Q filings. All models control for size (natural logarithm of market value), return on assets (ROA), loss indicator 
(negative net income), earnings growth, sales growth, market-to-book, big-8 auditor dummy, lag size, lag ROA, lag loss indicator, lag stock volatility, 
lag stock return, lag institutional ownership, and dummy indicating whether the litigation is either merger-related or accounting related. All models 
include year and industry (2-digit SIC code) fixed effects, with clustering at the firm level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Variable definitions are explained in Appendix B. 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables
Disclosure (PCA) -0.006 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004
(0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012)
Readability (PCA) 0.012 0.015 -0.009 -0.013
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011)
Uncertainty % (PCA) -0.019** -0.025** -0.021** -0.021**
(0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011)
Uncertainty Count (PCA) -0.021** -0.031** -0.004 -0.011
(0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.011)
Constant 0.099** 0.083* 0.116*** 0.110** 0.045 0.025 0.069 0.062 0.089** 0.097*** 0.109*** 0.090*** 0.070 0.081* 0.088** 0.075*
(0.043) (0.042) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1251 1251 1251 1251 1253 1253 1253 1253 1436 1436 1436 1436 1438 1438 1438 1438
Pseudo R-squared 0.090 0.091 0.093 0.094 0.087 0.088 0.091 0.092 0.070 0.071 0.074 0.070 0.088 0.089 0.091 0.089
CAR Window (-1,+1) CAR Window (-2,+2) CAR Window (-1,+1) CAR Window (-2,+2)
Panel A: 10K Filings (OLS Model) Panel B: 10Q Filings (OLS Model)
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Table 11: Principal Component Analysis – Settlement Amount 
The table shows the association between the principal components of degree, readability, and sentiments of a firm’s textual disclosure and the 
litigation settlement amount (cash amount and total amount) scaled by Disclosure Dollar Loss (DDL). Panel A has the results from analysis of firms’ 
10K filings, while Panel B has the results from analysis of firms’ 10Q filings. All models control for size (natural logarithm of market value), return 
on assets (ROA), loss indicator (negative net income), earnings growth, sales growth, market-to-book, big-8 auditor dummy, lag size, lag ROA, lag 
loss indicator, lag stock volatility, lag stock return, and lag institutional ownership. All models include year and industry (2-digit SIC code) fixed 
effects, with clustering at the firm level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Variable definitions are explained in Appendix B. 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables
Disclosure (PCA) -0.035 -0.034 -0.003 -0.002
(0.039) (0.039) (0.034) (0.034)
Readability (PCA) 0.003 0.002 -0.034 -0.034
(0.026) (0.026) (0.022) (0.022)
Uncertainty % (PCA) -0.071** -0.072** -0.053* -0.055*
(0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
Uncertainty Count (PCA) -0.017 -0.017 -0.014 -0.013
(0.040) (0.039) (0.031) (0.031)
Constant -1.831*** -2.087*** -2.288*** -1.986*** -1.774*** -2.012*** -2.221*** -1.918*** -2.058*** -2.175*** -2.162*** -2.106*** -1.965*** -2.090*** -2.080*** -2.019***
(0.477) (0.450) (0.390) (0.428) (0.479) (0.455) (0.398) (0.432) (0.388) (0.396) (0.353) (0.345) (0.392) (0.403) (0.360) (0.352)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 568 568 568 568 569 569 569 569 564 564 564 564 565 565 565 565
Pseudo R-squared 0.062 0.059 0.067 0.060 0.060 0.058 0.066 0.059 0.055 0.060 0.061 0.055 0.053 0.058 0.059 0.053
Cash Settlement Amount Total Settlement Amount Cash Settlement Amount Total Settlement Amount
Panel A: 10K Filings (OLS Model) Panel B: 10Q Filings (OLS Model)
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Table 12: Litigation Risk and Disclosure (1999 Ninth Circuit Decision)  
The table shows the association between litigation risk and disclosure by a firm. Panel A has the results from analysis of the 10K filings, while Panel 
B has the results from analysis of the 10Q filings. Using the 1999 Ninth Circuit Decision as a shock to a firm’s litigation risk, all models are 
conducted in a difference-in-difference setup, controlling for size (natural logarithm of market value), return on assets (ROA), earnings growth, sales 
growth, market-to-book, big-8 auditor dummy, stock volatility, and institutional ownership. All models include firm and year fixed effects, with 
clustering at the firm level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Variable 
definitions are explained in Appendix B. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables Disclosure (PCA) Uncertainty % (PCA) Uncertainty Count (PCA) Disclosure (PCA) Uncertainty % (PCA) Uncertainty Count (PCA)
9thCircuit x Post1999 -0.009 0.206** 0.147 0.240* 0.507*** 0.570***
(0.109) (0.095) (0.109) (0.124) (0.110) (0.121)
Size (ln_MV) 0.093*** -0.042* 0.052* 0.080*** -0.017 0.035
(0.026) (0.023) (0.029) (0.027) (0.025) (0.033)
ROA 0.005 -0.004 0.008 0.002 0.003 0.010
(0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.002) (0.012)
Earnings Growth -0.011* 0.001 -0.006* -0.011** -0.008 -0.010**
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Sales Growth -0.012*** -0.009** -0.012*** 0.017*** 0.007 0.005
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
Market-to-Book -0.015 -0.000 -0.016 0.001 0.002 -0.001
(0.023) (0.016) (0.018) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Volatility 0.032 0.072** 0.060 0.027 0.035 0.068*
(0.040) (0.033) (0.044) (0.037) (0.042) (0.041)
Stock Return -0.044*** 0.006 -0.040*** -0.038*** -0.021 -0.059***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019)
Big-8 Auditor 0.068 0.212** 0.096 0.228** 0.065 0.157*
(0.125) (0.099) (0.109) (0.107) (0.102) (0.092)
Institutional Ownership -0.206 0.192 0.229 -0.051 0.187 0.168
(0.220) (0.184) (0.336) (0.250) (0.227) (0.289)
Constant -0.607*** -0.223* -0.473*** -1.285*** -0.162 -0.560***
(0.171) (0.131) (0.172) (0.155) (0.143) (0.166)
Firm Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at Firm Level Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 10,694 10,696 10,696 11,598 11,600 11,600
Adjusted R-squared 0.695 0.784 0.673 0.760 0.756 0.752
Panel A: 10K Filings (OLS Model) Panel B: 10Q Filings (OLS Model)
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Table 13.1: Disclosure Analysis – Pre- vs. Post-Class Start Date (10K and 10Q Filings) 
The table shows the change in the textual disclosure (degree) of a firm’s filings pre- vs. post-class start date. Panel A and C have the results from 
analysis of firms’ 10K filings for settled and dismissed cases respectively. Panel B and D have the results from analysis of firms’ 10Q filings for 
settled and dismissed cases respectively. All models control for size (natural logarithm of market value), return on assets (ROA), loss indicator 
(negative net income), earnings growth, sales growth, market-to-book, big-8 auditor dummy, lag size, lag ROA, lag loss indicator, lag stock volatility, 
lag stock return, and lag institutional ownership. All models include year and industry (2-digit SIC code) fixed effects, with clustering at the firm 
level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Variable definitions are explained 
in Appendix B. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables LN (File Size) LN (Word Count)
LN (Complex 
Word Count)
LN (Sentence 
Count)
LN (Average 
Words per 
Sentence)
LN 
(Paragraph 
Count)
LN (Average 
Words per 
Paragraph)
LN (File Size) LN (Word Count)
LN (Complex 
Word Count)
LN (Sentence 
Count)
LN (Average 
Words per 
Sentence)
LN 
(Paragraph 
Count)
LN (Average 
Words per 
Paragraph)
Post-ClassStartDate x Litigated -0.258*** -0.077** -0.073** -0.073** -0.003 -0.068* -0.008 -0.348*** -0.143*** -0.146*** -0.124*** -0.018*** -0.066** -0.087***
(0.040) (0.033) (0.032) (0.029) (0.008) (0.037) (0.026) (0.043) (0.032) (0.032) (0.028) (0.007) (0.032) (0.030)
Litigated 0.031 0.019 0.021 0.020 -0.001 -0.020 0.040 0.071* 0.047 0.051 0.057** -0.007 0.068** -0.020
(0.039) (0.031) (0.030) (0.028) (0.007) (0.039) (0.031) (0.043) (0.031) (0.031) (0.028) (0.007) (0.032) (0.029)
Post-ClassStartDate -0.316*** -0.114*** -0.114*** -0.108*** -0.006* -0.067*** -0.047*** -0.432*** -0.217*** -0.224*** -0.196*** -0.021*** -0.140*** -0.090***
(0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.003) (0.013) (0.008) (0.020) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.005) (0.014) (0.012)
Constant 11.038*** 8.261*** 6.837*** 5.186*** 3.075*** 4.609*** 3.601*** 10.326*** 8.026*** 6.623*** 4.863*** 3.167*** 3.913*** 4.107***
(0.176) (0.152) (0.146) (0.125) (0.044) (0.150) (0.097) (0.153) (0.140) (0.137) (0.119) (0.031) (0.126) (0.073)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2581 2581 2581 2581 2581 2581 2581 2707 2707 2707 2707 2707 2707 2707
Pseudo R-squared 0.650 0.432 0.458 0.461 0.073 0.293 0.101 0.713 0.567 0.577 0.597 0.111 0.460 0.103
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables LN (File Size) LN (Word Count)
LN (Complex 
Word Count)
LN (Sentence 
Count)
LN (Average 
Words per 
Sentence)
LN 
(Paragraph 
Count)
LN (Average 
Words per 
Paragraph)
LN (File Size) LN (Word Count)
LN (Complex 
Word Count)
LN (Sentence 
Count)
LN (Average 
Words per 
Sentence)
LN 
(Paragraph 
Count)
LN (Average 
Words per 
Paragraph)
Post-ClassStartDate x Litigated -0.385*** -0.074** -0.072** -0.069** -0.005 -0.070** -0.003 -0.485*** -0.137*** -0.140*** -0.133*** -0.001 -0.122*** -0.014
(0.041) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027) (0.006) (0.028) (0.013) (0.045) (0.035) (0.035) (0.032) (0.007) (0.031) (0.013)
Litigated 0.038 0.031 0.032 0.034 -0.003 0.013 0.018 0.047 0.036 0.039 0.033 0.006 0.019 0.019
(0.040) (0.029) (0.028) (0.026) (0.006) (0.027) (0.013) (0.044) (0.034) (0.034) (0.031) (0.006) (0.030) (0.013)
Post-ClassStartDate -0.410*** -0.106*** -0.105*** -0.104*** -0.002 -0.084*** -0.022*** -0.524*** -0.177*** -0.183*** -0.167*** -0.010*** -0.144*** -0.034***
(0.019) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.002) (0.011) (0.005) (0.020) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.003) (0.011) (0.005)
Constant 11.562*** 9.102*** 7.705*** 6.025*** 3.077*** 5.129*** 3.944*** 9.418*** 6.922*** 5.427*** 3.895*** 3.026*** 3.030*** 3.837***
(0.530) (0.247) (0.232) (0.216) (0.043) (0.200) (0.114) (0.462) (0.163) (0.174) (0.160) (0.040) (0.138) (0.079)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2540 2540 2540 2540 2540 2540 2540 2598 2598 2598 2598 2598 2598 2598
Pseudo R-squared 0.745 0.440 0.458 0.460 0.055 0.363 0.093 0.789 0.539 0.544 0.561 0.115 0.510 0.208
Panel C: 10K Filings (Dismissed Cases) Panel D: 10Q Filings (Dismissed Cases)
Panel A: 10K Filings (Settled Cases) Panel B: 10Q Filings (Settled Cases)
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Table 13.2: Readability Analysis – Pre- vs. Post-Class Start Date (10K and 10Q Filings) 
The table shows the change in the textual disclosure (readability) of a firm’s filings pre- vs. post-class start date. Panel A and C have the results from 
analysis of firms’ 10K filings for settled and dismissed cases respectively. Panel B and D have the results from analysis of firms’ 10Q filings for 
settled and dismissed cases respectively. All models control for size (natural logarithm of market value), return on assets (ROA), loss indicator 
(negative net income), earnings growth, sales growth, market-to-book, big-8 auditor dummy, lag size, lag ROA, lag loss indicator, lag stock volatility, 
lag stock return, and lag institutional ownership. All models include year and industry (2-digit SIC code) fixed effects, with clustering at the firm 
level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Variable definitions are explained 
in Appendix B. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables
Automated 
Readability 
Index (ARI)
Flesch-
Kincaid 
Readability 
Index
Gunning Fog 
Readability
Smog 
Readability 
Index
Flesch 
Reading Ease 
Index
LIX 
Readability 
Index
RIX 
Readability 
Index
Automated 
Readability 
Index (ARI)
Flesch-
Kincaid 
Readability 
Index
Gunning Fog 
Readability
Smog 
Readability 
Index
Flesch 
Reading Ease 
Index
LIX 
Readability 
Index
RIX 
Readability 
Index
Post-ClassStartDate x Litigated -0.090 -0.039 0.005 0.001 0.129 0.003 -0.014 -0.241*** -0.249*** -0.211*** -0.146*** 0.970*** -0.508*** -0.175***
(0.093) (0.071) (0.075) (0.051) (0.221) (0.176) (0.059) (0.093) (0.071) (0.078) (0.053) (0.253) (0.185) (0.061)
Litigated -0.135 0.014 -0.002 0.003 -0.184 0.027 0.001 -0.214** -0.056 -0.058 -0.029 0.031 -0.202 -0.070
(0.090) (0.067) (0.071) (0.048) (0.211) (0.168) (0.057) (0.090) (0.069) (0.075) (0.051) (0.246) (0.177) (0.058)
Post-ClassStartDate -0.013 -0.089*** -0.043 -0.040* 0.429*** -0.137* -0.053** -0.145*** -0.271*** -0.243*** -0.180*** 1.124*** -0.502*** -0.175***
(0.041) (0.032) (0.034) (0.023) (0.096) (0.081) (0.027) (0.048) (0.039) (0.044) (0.031) (0.127) (0.099) (0.032)
Constant 21.500*** 13.461*** 18.411*** 16.196*** 37.691*** 54.359*** 7.041*** 21.572*** 14.406*** 19.402*** 16.936*** 34.372*** 56.986*** 7.877***
(0.520) (0.426) (0.433) (0.281) (1.202) (0.999) (0.325) (0.407) (0.314) (0.341) (0.222) (1.030) (0.758) (0.240)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2581 2581 2581 2581 2581 2581 2581 2707 2707 2707 2707 2707 2707 2707
Pseudo R-squared 0.106 0.142 0.119 0.127 0.286 0.154 0.120 0.060 0.222 0.171 0.188 0.347 0.153 0.136
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables
Automated 
Readability 
Index (ARI)
Flesch-
Kincaid 
Readability 
Index
Gunning Fog 
Readability
Smog 
Readability 
Index
Flesch 
Reading Ease 
Index
LIX 
Readability 
Index
RIX 
Readability 
Index
Automated 
Readability 
Index (ARI)
Flesch-
Kincaid 
Readability 
Index
Gunning Fog 
Readability
Smog 
Readability 
Index
Flesch 
Reading Ease 
Index
LIX 
Readability 
Index
RIX 
Readability 
Index
Post-ClassStartDate x Litigated 0.019 -0.030 -0.018 -0.018 0.052 -0.004 -0.017 0.091 -0.064 -0.052 -0.033 0.364 -0.011 -0.007
(0.082) (0.064) (0.068) (0.046) (0.207) (0.162) (0.053) (0.084) (0.068) (0.076) (0.053) (0.258) (0.174) (0.057)
Litigated -0.039 0.018 -0.020 -0.015 -0.264 0.066 0.006 0.055 0.079 0.058 0.048 -0.370 0.177 0.055
(0.080) (0.062) (0.067) (0.045) (0.205) (0.158) (0.052) (0.083) (0.066) (0.074) (0.052) (0.249) (0.171) (0.056)
Post-ClassStartDate 0.067** -0.053** -0.008 -0.009 0.299*** -0.078 -0.027 0.020 -0.168*** -0.151*** -0.109*** 0.794*** -0.246*** -0.082***
(0.027) (0.022) (0.024) (0.017) (0.081) (0.057) (0.018) (0.034) (0.029) (0.033) (0.023) (0.111) (0.075) (0.024)
Constant 20.826*** 14.061*** 18.665*** 16.374*** 33.187*** 55.837*** 7.330*** 20.838*** 12.746*** 17.206*** 15.413*** 40.152*** 53.851*** 6.804***
(0.496) (0.471) (0.482) (0.329) (2.384) (1.455) (0.395) (0.577) (0.495) (0.542) (0.380) (2.088) (1.397) (0.411)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2540 2540 2540 2540 2540 2540 2540 2598 2598 2598 2598 2598 2598 2598
Pseudo R-squared 0.060 0.127 0.097 0.105 0.264 0.139 0.103 0.046 0.212 0.154 0.165 0.300 0.138 0.126
Panel A: 10K Filings (Settled Cases) Panel B: 10Q Filings (Settled Cases)
Panel C: 10K Filings (Dismissed Cases) Panel D: 10Q Filings (Dismissed Cases)
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Table 13.3: Sentiment Analysis (Count) – Pre- vs. Post-Class Start Date (10K and 10Q Filings) 
The table shows the change in the textual disclosure (sentiment count) of a firm’s filings pre- vs. post-class start date. Panel A and C have the results 
from analysis of firms’ 10K filings for settled and dismissed cases respectively. Panel B and D have the results from analysis of firms’ 10Q filings 
for settled and dismissed cases respectively. All models control for size (natural logarithm of market value), return on assets (ROA), loss indicator 
(negative net income), earnings growth, sales growth, market-to-book, big-8 auditor dummy, lag size, lag ROA, lag loss indicator, lag stock volatility, 
lag stock return, and lag institutional ownership. All models include year and industry (2-digit SIC code) fixed effects, with clustering at the firm 
level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Variable definitions are explained 
in Appendix B. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables
LN 
(Uncertainty 
Word Count)
LN (Modal 
Weak Word 
Count)
LN (Negative 
Word Count)
LN (Positive 
Word Count)
LN (Litigious 
Word Count)
LN (Modal 
Strong Word 
Count)
LN (Harvard 
Negative 
Word Count)
LN 
(Uncertainty 
Word Count)
LN (Modal 
Weak Word 
Count)
LN (Negative 
Word Count)
LN (Positive 
Word Count)
LN (Litigious 
Word Count)
LN (Modal 
Strong Word 
Count)
LN (Harvard 
Negative 
Word Count)
Post-ClassStartDate x Litigated -0.124*** -0.102** -0.186*** -0.073* -0.093* -0.020 -0.139*** -0.229*** -0.250*** -0.262*** -0.175*** -0.186*** -0.118** -0.217***
(0.035) (0.044) (0.045) (0.039) (0.049) (0.044) (0.035) (0.042) (0.055) (0.051) (0.039) (0.054) (0.050) (0.036)
Litigated 0.055 0.095** 0.000 0.048 -0.020 0.081* 0.003 0.064 0.026 0.024 0.051 0.014 0.108** 0.015
(0.034) (0.042) (0.042) (0.037) (0.046) (0.042) (0.033) (0.041) (0.055) (0.050) (0.038) (0.054) (0.049) (0.036)
Post-ClassStartDate -0.199*** -0.221*** -0.214*** -0.127*** -0.109*** -0.134*** -0.157*** -0.331*** -0.327*** -0.334*** -0.233*** -0.235*** -0.257*** -0.264***
(0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.021) (0.019) (0.015) (0.022) (0.026) (0.024) (0.017) (0.026) (0.023) (0.017)
Constant 3.051*** 1.365*** 2.293*** 2.848*** 3.475*** 1.460*** 4.456*** 3.309*** 2.173*** 3.388*** 2.878*** 2.508*** 2.589*** 4.275***
(0.174) (0.242) (0.212) (0.193) (0.247) (0.215) (0.161) (0.183) (0.240) (0.203) (0.157) (0.229) (0.219) (0.148)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2581 2581 2581 2581 2581 2581 2581 2707 2703 2707 2707 2707 2699 2707
Pseudo R-squared 0.530 0.470 0.479 0.396 0.378 0.376 0.497 0.563 0.433 0.527 0.529 0.401 0.425 0.585
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables
LN 
(Uncertainty 
Word Count)
LN (Modal 
Weak Word 
Count)
LN (Negative 
Word Count)
LN (Positive 
Word Count)
LN (Litigious 
Word Count)
LN (Modal 
Strong Word 
Count)
LN (Harvard 
Negative 
Word Count)
LN 
(Uncertainty 
Word Count)
LN (Modal 
Weak Word 
Count)
LN (Negative 
Word Count)
LN (Positive 
Word Count)
LN (Litigious 
Word Count)
LN (Modal 
Strong Word 
Count)
LN (Harvard 
Negative 
Word Count)
Post-ClassStartDate x Litigated -0.108*** -0.114*** -0.165*** -0.078** -0.138*** -0.050 -0.128*** -0.180*** -0.170*** -0.296*** -0.170*** -0.267*** -0.120** -0.209***
(0.032) (0.039) (0.040) (0.034) (0.046) (0.039) (0.032) (0.040) (0.054) (0.051) (0.038) (0.054) (0.049) (0.037)
Litigated 0.067** 0.071* 0.024 0.042 -0.033 0.065* 0.023 0.068* 0.081 -0.021 0.018 -0.038 0.079 0.006
(0.031) (0.037) (0.039) (0.033) (0.045) (0.038) (0.032) (0.039) (0.053) (0.049) (0.037) (0.053) (0.049) (0.036)
Post-ClassStartDate -0.180*** -0.200*** -0.200*** -0.127*** -0.104*** -0.123*** -0.156*** -0.261*** -0.264*** -0.273*** -0.191*** -0.242*** -0.207*** -0.216***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.016) (0.021) (0.022) (0.015)
Constant 3.917*** 3.036*** 4.110*** 4.052*** 4.303*** 3.103*** 5.278*** 1.472*** 0.288 1.607*** 1.627*** 1.631*** 0.294 3.147***
(0.315) (0.372) (0.356) (0.292) (0.341) (0.321) (0.278) (0.270) (0.405) (0.287) (0.230) (0.255) (0.344) (0.175)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2540 2540 2540 2540 2540 2540 2540 2596 2596 2596 2596 2596 2586 2596
Pseudo R-squared 0.551 0.529 0.502 0.416 0.361 0.412 0.506 0.564 0.451 0.496 0.525 0.433 0.400 0.575
Panel A: 10K Filings (Settled Cases) Panel B: 10Q Filings (Settled Cases)
Panel C: 10K Filings (Dismissed Cases) Panel D: 10Q Filings (Dismissed Cases)
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Table 13.4: Sentiment Analysis (%) – Pre- vs. Post-Class Start Date (10K and 10Q Filings) 
The table shows the change in the textual disclosure (sentiment %) of a firm’s filings pre- vs. post-class start date. Panel A and C have the results 
from analysis of firms’ 10K filings for settled and dismissed cases respectively. Panel B and D have the results from analysis of firms’ 10Q filings 
for settled and dismissed cases respectively. All models control for size (natural logarithm of market value), return on assets (ROA), loss indicator 
(negative net income), earnings growth, sales growth, market-to-book, big-8 auditor dummy, lag size, lag ROA, lag loss indicator, lag stock volatility, 
lag stock return, and lag institutional ownership. All models include year and industry (2-digit SIC code) fixed effects, with clustering at the firm 
level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Variable definitions are explained 
in Appendix B. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables
Uncertainty 
Word 
Proportion
Modal Weak 
Word 
Proportion
Negative 
Word 
Proportion
Positive 
Word 
Proportion
Litigious 
Word 
Proportion
Modal Strong 
Word 
Proportion
Harvard 
Negative 
Word 
Proportion
Uncertainty 
Word 
Proportion
Modal Weak 
Word 
Proportion
Negative 
Word 
Proportion
Positive 
Word 
Proportion
Litigious 
Word 
Proportion
Modal Strong 
Word 
Proportion
Harvard 
Negative 
Word 
Proportion
Post-ClassStartDate x Litigated -0.059*** -0.016 -0.158*** -0.002 -0.022 0.019*** -0.240*** -0.076*** -0.021 -0.150*** -0.015 -0.050 0.016* -0.267***
(0.018) (0.012) (0.029) (0.012) (0.042) (0.007) (0.035) (0.025) (0.017) (0.041) (0.013) (0.036) (0.008) (0.045)
Litigated 0.035* 0.026** -0.051* 0.009 -0.061 0.015** -0.096*** 0.022 0.004 -0.054 -0.002 -0.057 0.016** -0.142***
(0.018) (0.012) (0.029) (0.012) (0.041) (0.007) (0.035) (0.025) (0.017) (0.039) (0.013) (0.036) (0.008) (0.044)
Post-ClassStartDate -0.095*** -0.042*** -0.121*** -0.002 0.024 0.001 -0.135*** -0.106*** -0.031*** -0.121*** -0.001 -0.005 -0.002 -0.142***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.013) (0.005) (0.017) (0.003) (0.017) (0.011) (0.006) (0.017) (0.006) (0.016) (0.004) (0.019)
Constant 0.511*** -0.078 -0.149 0.480*** 1.016*** 0.067** 2.498*** 1.065*** 0.356*** 0.983*** 0.668*** 0.449*** 0.638*** 2.539***
(0.081) (0.057) (0.133) (0.055) (0.215) (0.033) (0.172) (0.086) (0.053) (0.132) (0.054) (0.148) (0.029) (0.184)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2581 2581 2581 2581 2581 2581 2581 2707 2707 2707 2707 2707 2707 2707
Pseudo R-squared 0.369 0.332 0.356 0.161 0.190 0.257 0.345 0.303 0.244 0.304 0.141 0.163 0.213 0.280
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables
Uncertainty 
Word 
Proportion
Modal Weak 
Word 
Proportion
Negative 
Word 
Proportion
Positive 
Word 
Proportion
Litigious 
Word 
Proportion
Modal Strong 
Word 
Proportion
Harvard 
Negative 
Word 
Proportion
Uncertainty 
Word 
Proportion
Modal Weak 
Word 
Proportion
Negative 
Word 
Proportion
Positive 
Word 
Proportion
Litigious 
Word 
Proportion
Modal Strong 
Word 
Proportion
Harvard 
Negative 
Word 
Proportion
Post-ClassStartDate x Litigated -0.037** -0.013 -0.116*** 0.004 -0.055 0.010* -0.187*** -0.024 -0.002 -0.163*** -0.007 -0.083** 0.009 -0.192***
(0.017) (0.011) (0.026) (0.011) (0.038) (0.006) (0.036) (0.025) (0.018) (0.041) (0.012) (0.040) (0.008) (0.046)
Litigated 0.038** 0.020* -0.015 0.008 -0.080** 0.008 -0.044 0.043* 0.021 -0.049 -0.007 -0.043 0.009 -0.070
(0.017) (0.011) (0.026) (0.011) (0.036) (0.006) (0.035) (0.024) (0.018) (0.041) (0.012) (0.039) (0.008) (0.045)
Post-ClassStartDate -0.082*** -0.042*** -0.111*** -0.008** 0.027** -0.001 -0.153*** -0.077*** -0.029*** -0.104*** -0.001 -0.047*** -0.000 -0.111***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.013) (0.003) (0.015) (0.011) (0.007) (0.016) (0.005) (0.015) (0.003) (0.018)
Constant 0.576*** 0.257*** 0.710*** 0.741*** 1.044*** 0.290*** 2.401*** 0.338*** -0.004 0.141 0.601*** 0.469*** 0.204*** 2.413***
(0.147) (0.066) (0.156) (0.063) (0.236) (0.051) (0.313) (0.120) (0.121) (0.189) (0.133) (0.140) (0.070) (0.285)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2540 2540 2540 2540 2540 2540 2540 2598 2598 2598 2598 2598 2598 2598
Pseudo R-squared 0.382 0.372 0.396 0.199 0.198 0.285 0.346 0.284 0.247 0.257 0.165 0.138 0.243 0.251
Panel A: 10K Filings (Settled Cases) Panel B: 10Q Filings (Settled Cases)
Panel C: 10K Filings (Dismissed Cases) Panel D: 10Q Filings (Dismissed Cases)
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Table 14.1: Disclosure Analysis – Pre- vs. Post-Litigation (10K and 10Q Filings) 
The table shows the change in the textual disclosure (degree) of a firm’s filings pre- vs. post-litigation. Panel A and C have the results from analysis 
of firms’ 10K filings for settled and dismissed cases respectively. Panel B and D have the results from analysis of firms’ 10Q filings for settled and 
dismissed cases respectively. All models control for size (natural logarithm of market value), return on assets (ROA), loss indicator (negative net 
income), earnings growth, sales growth, market-to-book, big-8 auditor dummy, lag size, lag ROA, lag loss indicator, lag stock volatility, lag stock 
return, and lag institutional ownership. All models include year and industry (2-digit SIC code) fixed effects, with clustering at the firm level. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Variable definitions are explained in 
Appendix B. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables LN (File Size) LN (Word Count)
LN (Complex 
Word Count)
LN (Sentence 
Count)
LN (Average 
Words per 
Sentence)
LN 
(Paragraph 
Count)
LN (Average 
Words per 
Paragraph)
LN (File Size) LN (Word Count)
LN (Complex 
Word Count)
LN (Sentence 
Count)
LN (Average 
Words per 
Sentence)
LN 
(Paragraph 
Count)
LN (Average 
Words per 
Paragraph)
Post-CaseFilingDate x Litigated -0.752*** -0.161*** -0.162*** -0.166*** 0.005 -0.117*** -0.042** -0.892*** -0.202*** -0.198*** -0.204*** -0.001 -0.130*** -0.079***
(0.042) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027) (0.006) (0.029) (0.017) (0.043) (0.029) (0.030) (0.027) (0.006) (0.030) (0.024)
Litigated 0.123*** 0.090*** 0.088*** 0.072*** 0.018*** 0.072** 0.018 0.173*** 0.161*** 0.172*** 0.132*** 0.027*** 0.127*** 0.036
(0.039) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027) (0.006) (0.031) (0.020) (0.039) (0.028) (0.028) (0.025) (0.005) (0.029) (0.024)
Post-CaseFilingDate -0.815*** -0.236*** -0.238*** -0.231*** -0.005 -0.177*** -0.057*** -1.020*** -0.381*** -0.391*** -0.368*** -0.016*** -0.300*** -0.086***
(0.024) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.004) (0.016) (0.007) (0.024) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.003) (0.015) (0.011)
Constant 11.596*** 9.237*** 7.742*** 6.112*** 3.125*** 5.149*** 4.069*** 9.856*** 7.590*** 6.147*** 4.449*** 3.161*** 3.383*** 4.142***
(0.176) (0.221) (0.205) (0.176) (0.058) (0.204) (0.078) (0.208) (0.224) (0.224) (0.190) (0.050) (0.201) (0.094)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2956 2956 2956 2956 2956 2956 2956 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380
Pseudo R-squared 0.689 0.382 0.407 0.402 0.085 0.293 0.044 0.726 0.513 0.521 0.539 0.101 0.415 0.059
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables LN (File Size) LN (Word Count)
LN (Complex 
Word Count)
LN (Sentence 
Count)
LN (Average 
Words per 
Sentence)
LN 
(Paragraph 
Count)
LN (Average 
Words per 
Paragraph)
LN (File Size) LN (Word Count)
LN (Complex 
Word Count)
LN (Sentence 
Count)
LN (Average 
Words per 
Sentence)
LN 
(Paragraph 
Count)
LN (Average 
Words per 
Paragraph)
Post-CaseFilingDate x Litigated -0.888*** -0.124*** -0.120*** -0.119*** -0.005 -0.096*** -0.028 -0.875*** -0.113*** -0.113*** -0.120*** 0.005 -0.118*** 0.005
(0.042) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027) (0.007) (0.037) (0.029) (0.044) (0.030) (0.031) (0.028) (0.006) (0.031) (0.020)
Litigated 0.065* 0.115*** 0.117*** 0.107*** 0.008 0.078** 0.037 0.255*** 0.215*** 0.219*** 0.187*** 0.027*** 0.141*** 0.074***
(0.038) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.006) (0.037) (0.031) (0.040) (0.027) (0.028) (0.025) (0.005) (0.031) (0.023)
Post-CaseFilingDate -0.928*** -0.236*** -0.234*** -0.223*** -0.013*** -0.208*** -0.028** -1.115*** -0.322*** -0.329*** -0.296*** -0.026*** -0.260*** -0.062***
(0.023) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.003) (0.017) (0.013) (0.025) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.003) (0.015) (0.008)
Constant 12.508*** 9.084*** 7.643*** 6.034*** 3.050*** 5.113*** 3.951*** 9.782*** 7.044*** 5.525*** 4.041*** 2.996*** 3.103*** 3.928***
(0.502) (0.188) (0.173) (0.152) (0.059) (0.178) (0.077) (0.269) (0.225) (0.230) (0.202) (0.035) (0.200) (0.103)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2602 2602 2602 2602 2602 2602 2602 2717 2717 2717 2717 2717 2717 2717
Pseudo R-squared 0.722 0.443 0.465 0.461 0.104 0.260 0.012 0.769 0.572 0.572 0.578 0.161 0.465 0.050
Panel C: 10K Filings (Dismissed Cases) Panel D: 10Q Filings (Dismissed Cases)
Panel A: 10K Filings (Settled Cases) Panel B: 10Q Filings (Settled Cases)
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Table 14.2: Readability Analysis - Pre vs. Post-Litigation (10K and 10Q Filings) 
The table shows the change in the textual disclosure (readability) of a firm’s filings pre- vs. post-litigation. Panel A and C have the results from 
analysis of firms’ 10K filings for settled and dismissed cases respectively. Panel B and D have the results from analysis of firms’ 10Q filings for 
settled and dismissed cases respectively. All models control for size (natural logarithm of market value), return on assets (ROA), loss indicator 
(negative net income), earnings growth, sales growth, market-to-book, big-8 auditor dummy, lag size, lag ROA, lag loss indicator, lag stock volatility, 
lag stock return, and lag institutional ownership. All models include year and industry (2-digit SIC code) fixed effects, with clustering at the firm 
level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Variable definitions are explained 
in Appendix B. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables
Automated 
Readability 
Index (ARI)
Flesch-
Kincaid 
Readability 
Index
Gunning Fog 
Readability
Smog 
Readability 
Index
Flesch 
Reading Ease 
Index
LIX 
Readability 
Index
RIX 
Readability 
Index
Automated 
Readability 
Index (ARI)
Flesch-
Kincaid 
Readability 
Index
Gunning Fog 
Readability
Smog 
Readability 
Index
Flesch 
Reading Ease 
Index
LIX 
Readability 
Index
RIX 
Readability 
Index
Post-CaseFilingDate x Litigated 0.185** -0.023 0.048 0.025 0.434** 0.121 0.037 0.152** -0.058 0.026 0.019 0.340 0.253 0.054
(0.080) (0.061) (0.066) (0.046) (0.208) (0.153) (0.052) (0.077) (0.061) (0.068) (0.047) (0.235) (0.161) (0.052)
Litigated 0.107 0.153** 0.147** 0.110** -0.339* 0.368** 0.140*** 0.261*** 0.330*** 0.372*** 0.265*** -1.198*** 0.824*** 0.270***
(0.078) (0.060) (0.063) (0.043) (0.190) (0.149) (0.050) (0.074) (0.058) (0.063) (0.043) (0.211) (0.150) (0.049)
Post-CaseFilingDate 0.133*** -0.135*** -0.040 -0.046* 0.886*** -0.219** -0.072** 0.097** -0.311*** -0.224*** -0.167*** 1.565*** -0.259*** -0.109***
(0.047) (0.039) (0.040) (0.028) (0.126) (0.093) (0.031) (0.042) (0.034) (0.038) (0.027) (0.133) (0.088) (0.028)
Constant 20.936*** 13.899*** 18.207*** 16.046*** 36.629*** 55.536*** 7.416*** 23.252*** 14.134*** 19.094*** 16.687*** 36.312*** 57.652*** 8.097***
(0.729) (0.594) (0.585) (0.367) (1.496) (1.363) (0.463) (0.600) (0.496) (0.501) (0.335) (1.662) (1.262) (0.383)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2956 2956 2956 2956 2956 2956 2956 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380
Pseudo R-squared 0.093 0.142 0.133 0.140 0.288 0.150 0.121 0.074 0.203 0.155 0.170 0.319 0.145 0.129
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables
Automated 
Readability 
Index (ARI)
Flesch-
Kincaid 
Readability 
Index
Gunning Fog 
Readability
Smog 
Readability 
Index
Flesch 
Reading Ease 
Index
LIX 
Readability 
Index
RIX 
Readability 
Index
Automated 
Readability 
Index (ARI)
Flesch-
Kincaid 
Readability 
Index
Gunning Fog 
Readability
Smog 
Readability 
Index
Flesch 
Reading Ease 
Index
LIX 
Readability 
Index
RIX 
Readability 
Index
Post-CaseFilingDate x Litigated 0.129 -0.033 0.011 -0.006 0.122 0.086 0.001 0.180** 0.012 0.059 0.036 0.147 0.367** 0.101*
(0.089) (0.066) (0.071) (0.048) (0.209) (0.170) (0.056) (0.079) (0.064) (0.070) (0.049) (0.249) (0.163) (0.053)
Litigated 0.096 0.136** 0.096 0.067 -0.625*** 0.365** 0.108** 0.233*** 0.320*** 0.301*** 0.211*** -1.109*** 0.732*** 0.248***
(0.081) (0.059) (0.063) (0.043) (0.186) (0.151) (0.050) (0.074) (0.057) (0.062) (0.043) (0.220) (0.147) (0.048)
Post-CaseFilingDate 0.031 -0.181*** -0.090*** -0.074*** 0.822*** -0.285*** -0.107*** -0.091** -0.368*** -0.317*** -0.228*** 1.492*** -0.504*** -0.192***
(0.042) (0.031) (0.033) (0.023) (0.110) (0.079) (0.026) (0.038) (0.033) (0.036) (0.025) (0.132) (0.084) (0.027)
Constant 20.367*** 13.494*** 17.807*** 15.820*** 35.453*** 54.546*** 6.942*** 20.003*** 12.063*** 16.512*** 14.942*** 43.204*** 51.772*** 6.174***
(0.579) (0.495) (0.448) (0.299) (1.211) (1.119) (0.403) (0.410) (0.385) (0.412) (0.276) (1.538) (0.906) (0.277)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2602 2602 2602 2602 2602 2602 2602 2717 2717 2717 2717 2717 2717 2717
Pseudo R-squared 0.093 0.178 0.148 0.155 0.307 0.167 0.144 0.068 0.258 0.195 0.204 0.315 0.176 0.170
Panel A: 10K Filings (Settled Cases) Panel B: 10Q Filings (Settled Cases)
Panel C: 10K Filings (Dismissed Cases) Panel D: 10Q Filings (Dismissed Cases)
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Table 14.3: Sentiment (count) Analysis - Pre vs. Post-Litigation (10K and 10Q Filings) 
The table shows the change in the textual disclosure (sentiment count) of a firm’s filings pre- vs. post-litigation. Panel A and C have the results from 
analysis of firms’ 10K filings for settled and dismissed cases respectively. Panel B and D have the results from analysis of firms’ 10Q filings for 
settled and dismissed cases respectively. All models control for size (natural logarithm of market value), return on assets (ROA), loss indicator 
(negative net income), earnings growth, sales growth, market-to-book, big-8 auditor dummy, lag size, lag ROA, lag loss indicator, lag stock volatility, 
lag stock return, and lag institutional ownership. All models include year and industry (2-digit SIC code) fixed effects, with clustering at the firm 
level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Variable definitions are explained 
in Appendix B. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables
LN 
(Uncertainty 
Word Count)
LN (Modal 
Weak Word 
Count)
LN (Negative 
Word Count)
LN (Positive 
Word Count)
LN (Litigious 
Word Count)
LN (Modal 
Strong Word 
Count)
LN (Harvard 
Negative 
Word Count)
LN 
(Uncertainty 
Word Count)
LN (Modal 
Weak Word 
Count)
LN (Negative 
Word Count)
LN (Positive 
Word Count)
LN (Litigious 
Word Count)
LN (Modal 
Strong Word 
Count)
LN (Harvard 
Negative 
Word Count)
Post-CaseFilingDate x Litigated -0.264*** -0.261*** -0.240*** -0.205*** -0.055 -0.137*** -0.256*** -0.256*** -0.219*** -0.124*** -0.249*** 0.016 -0.084* -0.224***
(0.033) (0.040) (0.040) (0.033) (0.044) (0.038) (0.033) (0.039) (0.052) (0.045) (0.037) (0.049) (0.046) (0.034)
Litigated 0.109*** 0.151*** 0.164*** 0.059* 0.172*** 0.119*** 0.085** 0.175*** 0.180*** 0.325*** 0.138*** 0.402*** 0.236*** 0.179***
(0.033) (0.037) (0.039) (0.033) (0.042) (0.036) (0.033) (0.036) (0.047) (0.043) (0.035) (0.047) (0.043) (0.032)
Post-CaseFilingDate -0.393*** -0.460*** -0.398*** -0.279*** -0.177*** -0.264*** -0.338*** -0.536*** -0.564*** -0.522*** -0.432*** -0.388*** -0.404*** -0.460***
(0.020) (0.024) (0.024) (0.020) (0.026) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.029) (0.025) (0.020) (0.027) (0.026) (0.018)
Constant 4.255*** 2.986*** 4.175*** 4.348*** 3.945*** 3.512*** 5.607*** 2.978*** 1.934*** 2.634*** 2.511*** 2.401*** 1.504*** 3.812***
(0.252) (0.262) (0.325) (0.240) (0.377) (0.253) (0.229) (0.246) (0.304) (0.413) (0.220) (0.388) (0.266) (0.260)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2956 2952 2956 2956 2956 2954 2956 3378 3376 3380 3380 3380 3374 3380
Pseudo R-squared 0.464 0.481 0.432 0.362 0.336 0.363 0.436 0.518 0.404 0.474 0.466 0.356 0.372 0.527
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables
LN 
(Uncertainty 
Word Count)
LN (Modal 
Weak Word 
Count)
LN (Negative 
Word Count)
LN (Positive 
Word Count)
LN (Litigious 
Word Count)
LN (Modal 
Strong Word 
Count)
LN (Harvard 
Negative 
Word Count)
LN 
(Uncertainty 
Word Count)
LN (Modal 
Weak Word 
Count)
LN (Negative 
Word Count)
LN (Positive 
Word Count)
LN (Litigious 
Word Count)
LN (Modal 
Strong Word 
Count)
LN (Harvard 
Negative 
Word Count)
Post-CaseFilingDate x Litigated -0.214*** -0.241*** -0.175*** -0.148*** -0.044 -0.082** -0.182*** -0.125*** -0.081 -0.038 -0.154*** 0.052 -0.037 -0.125***
(0.033) (0.041) (0.039) (0.035) (0.044) (0.040) (0.033) (0.039) (0.055) (0.046) (0.038) (0.054) (0.048) (0.035)
Litigated 0.144*** 0.173*** 0.200*** 0.121*** 0.189*** 0.176*** 0.143*** 0.255*** 0.324*** 0.368*** 0.203*** 0.424*** 0.264*** 0.250***
(0.030) (0.036) (0.036) (0.032) (0.041) (0.037) (0.030) (0.036) (0.049) (0.041) (0.033) (0.047) (0.042) (0.031)
Post-CaseFilingDate -0.363*** -0.422*** -0.378*** -0.273*** -0.219*** -0.265*** -0.324*** -0.400*** -0.424*** -0.404*** -0.352*** -0.363*** -0.310*** -0.373***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.023) (0.031) (0.027) (0.020) (0.027) (0.027) (0.019)
Constant 4.239*** 3.027*** 4.219*** 3.933*** 4.082*** 3.255*** 5.369*** 1.895*** 0.659 1.864*** 1.989*** 1.877*** 1.031** 3.335***
(0.199) (0.237) (0.313) (0.214) (0.368) (0.278) (0.216) (0.322) (0.412) (0.340) (0.256) (0.380) (0.426) (0.229)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2602 2602 2602 2602 2602 2602 2602 2717 2717 2717 2717 2717 2712 2717
Pseudo R-squared 0.532 0.498 0.480 0.422 0.391 0.356 0.499 0.536 0.428 0.504 0.520 0.444 0.406 0.569
Panel A: 10K Filings (Settled Cases) Panel B: 10Q Filings (Settled Cases)
Panel C: 10K Filings (Dismissed Cases) Panel D: 10Q Filings (Dismissed Cases)
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Table 14.4: Sentiment (%) Analysis - Pre vs. Post-Litigation (10K and 10Q Filings) 
The table shows the change in the textual disclosure (sentiment %) of a firm’s filings pre- vs. post-litigation. Panel A and C have the results from 
analysis of firms’ 10K filings for settled and dismissed cases respectively. Panel B and D have the results from analysis of firms’ 10Q filings for 
settled and dismissed cases respectively. All models control for size (natural logarithm of market value), return on assets (ROA), loss indicator 
(negative net income), earnings growth, sales growth, market-to-book, big-8 auditor dummy, lag size, lag ROA, lag loss indicator, lag stock volatility, 
lag stock return, and lag institutional ownership. All models include year and industry (2-digit SIC code) fixed effects, with clustering at the firm 
level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Variable definitions are explained 
in Appendix B. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables
Uncertainty 
Word 
Proportion
Modal Weak 
Word 
Proportion
Negative 
Word 
Proportion
Positive 
Word 
Proportion
Litigious 
Word 
Proportion
Modal Strong 
Word 
Proportion
Harvard 
Negative 
Word 
Proportion
Uncertainty 
Word 
Proportion
Modal Weak 
Word 
Proportion
Negative 
Word 
Proportion
Positive 
Word 
Proportion
Litigious 
Word 
Proportion
Modal Strong 
Word 
Proportion
Harvard 
Negative 
Word 
Proportion
Post-CaseFilingDate x Litigated -0.117*** -0.047*** -0.099*** -0.024** 0.154*** 0.014** -0.318*** -0.043* 0.009 0.138*** -0.030** 0.200*** 0.037*** -0.071
(0.019) (0.013) (0.028) (0.011) (0.033) (0.006) (0.036) (0.025) (0.019) (0.045) (0.012) (0.036) (0.007) (0.044)
Litigated 0.020 0.023* 0.113*** -0.033*** 0.078** 0.007 -0.031 0.008 0.001 0.236*** -0.030*** 0.212*** 0.014** 0.030
(0.018) (0.012) (0.026) (0.011) (0.032) (0.006) (0.033) (0.023) (0.016) (0.041) (0.011) (0.034) (0.007) (0.041)
Post-CaseFilingDate -0.177*** -0.098*** -0.209*** -0.015** 0.120*** 0.005 -0.316*** -0.171*** -0.085*** -0.189*** -0.016** 0.018 0.005 -0.237***
(0.010) (0.006) (0.015) (0.007) (0.021) (0.004) (0.019) (0.014) (0.009) (0.022) (0.007) (0.019) (0.004) (0.024)
Constant 0.697*** 0.136*** 0.483*** 0.879*** 0.626** 0.390*** 2.875*** 1.025*** 0.339*** 0.710*** 0.739*** 0.703*** 0.278*** 2.562***
(0.095) (0.046) (0.143) (0.079) (0.311) (0.040) (0.160) (0.117) (0.065) (0.200) (0.072) (0.228) (0.033) (0.279)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2956 2956 2956 2956 2956 2956 2956 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380
Pseudo R-squared 0.333 0.360 0.351 0.172 0.226 0.246 0.308 0.277 0.278 0.248 0.177 0.128 0.236 0.209
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables
Uncertainty 
Word 
Proportion
Modal Weak 
Word 
Proportion
Negative 
Word 
Proportion
Positive 
Word 
Proportion
Litigious 
Word 
Proportion
Modal Strong 
Word 
Proportion
Harvard 
Negative 
Word 
Proportion
Uncertainty 
Word 
Proportion
Modal Weak 
Word 
Proportion
Negative 
Word 
Proportion
Positive 
Word 
Proportion
Litigious 
Word 
Proportion
Modal Strong 
Word 
Proportion
Harvard 
Negative 
Word 
Proportion
Post-CaseFilingDate x Litigated -0.102*** -0.057*** -0.058** -0.010 0.123*** 0.018*** -0.172*** 0.002 0.015 0.156*** -0.020 0.162*** 0.030*** -0.022
(0.018) (0.013) (0.027) (0.012) (0.036) (0.006) (0.035) (0.027) (0.019) (0.042) (0.013) (0.040) (0.008) (0.043)
Litigated 0.032* 0.025** 0.119*** -0.004 0.068** 0.016*** 0.099*** 0.039 0.042** 0.257*** -0.014 0.181*** 0.014** 0.126***
(0.016) (0.011) (0.027) (0.011) (0.032) (0.006) (0.032) (0.025) (0.018) (0.039) (0.011) (0.035) (0.007) (0.041)
Post-CaseFilingDate -0.144*** -0.090*** -0.180*** -0.015** 0.069*** -0.001 -0.271*** -0.072*** -0.038*** -0.091*** -0.006 -0.007 0.014*** -0.147***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.014) (0.006) (0.018) (0.004) (0.019) (0.015) (0.011) (0.022) (0.007) (0.018) (0.004) (0.024)
Constant 0.902*** 0.267*** 0.804*** 0.689*** 0.744** 0.363*** 2.821*** 0.580*** 0.079 0.357 0.814*** 0.752*** 0.324*** 2.712***
(0.089) (0.061) (0.204) (0.078) (0.341) (0.045) (0.281) (0.140) (0.075) (0.309) (0.080) (0.266) (0.047) (0.344)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2602 2602 2602 2602 2602 2602 2602 2717 2717 2717 2717 2717 2717 2717
Pseudo R-squared 0.337 0.375 0.340 0.222 0.252 0.225 0.330 0.181 0.199 0.243 0.185 0.176 0.229 0.233
Panel A: 10K Filings (Settled Cases) Panel B: 10Q Filings (Settled Cases)
Panel C: 10K Filings (Dismissed Cases) Panel D: 10Q Filings (Dismissed Cases)
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Table 15: Principal Component Analysis – Controlling for Largest Stock Price Drop 
The table shows the association between the principal components of degree, readability, and sentiments 
of a firm’s textual disclosure and the probability of the firm being litigated. Panel A has the results from 
analysis of firms’ 10K filings, while Panel B has the results from analysis of firms’ 10Q filings. All models 
control for size (natural logarithm of market value), return on assets (ROA), loss indicator (negative net 
income), earnings growth, sales growth, market-to-book, big-8 auditor dummy, lag size, lag ROA, lag loss 
indicator, lag stock volatility, lag stock return, lag institutional ownership, and the largest daily stock price 
drop during the alleged damage period. All models include year and industry (2-digit SIC code) fixed 
effects, with clustering at the firm level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Variable definitions are explained in Appendix B. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables D_litigation D_litigation D_litigation D_litigation D_litigation D_litigation D_litigation D_litigation
Disclosure (PCA) 0.123*** 0.267***
(0.028) (0.028)
Readability (PCA) 0.044*** 0.100***
(0.017) (0.016)
Uncertainty % (PCA) 0.183*** 0.199***
(0.034) (0.027)
Uncertainty Count (PCA) 0.136*** 0.168***
(0.035) (0.029)
Size (ln_MV) -1.017*** -1.011*** -1.010*** -1.012*** -0.879*** -0.870*** -0.865*** -0.872***
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.066) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) (0.058)
ROA 0.024 0.023 0.018 0.022 0.029 0.027 0.025 0.025
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.038) (0.034) (0.036) (0.035)
Earnings Growth -0.014 -0.012 -0.023 -0.016 0.009 0.027 0.007 0.008
(0.064) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.079) (0.031) (0.050)
Sales Growth 0.036 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.016 0.013 0.018 0.016
(0.031) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
Loss Indicator -0.509*** -0.494*** -0.528*** -0.511*** -0.608*** -0.505*** -0.550*** -0.556***
(0.098) (0.098) (0.099) (0.098) (0.098) (0.096) (0.097) (0.097)
Lag Size (ln_MV) 1.189*** 1.210*** 1.212*** 1.187*** 1.000*** 1.064*** 1.056*** 1.038***
(0.072) (0.072) (0.073) (0.072) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
Lag_Market-to-Book 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Lag_Volatility 0.307* 0.331* 0.255 0.281 0.422*** 0.514*** 0.414*** 0.444***
(0.182) (0.188) (0.181) (0.184) (0.135) (0.136) (0.136) (0.136)
Lag_Return on Assets (ROA) -0.020 -0.027 -0.026 -0.023 -0.004 -0.012 -0.016 -0.010
(0.038) (0.053) (0.044) (0.043) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030)
Lag_Loss Indicator -0.035 0.016 -0.035 -0.036 -0.037 0.022 -0.014 -0.007
(0.101) (0.100) (0.100) (0.102) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097)
Stock Return 0.006 0.001 -0.006 0.003 -0.030 -0.045 -0.036 -0.037
(0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.042) (0.043) (0.041) (0.041)
Big-8 Auditor 0.040 0.040 0.023 0.034 -0.075 0.000 -0.027 -0.030
(0.122) (0.123) (0.123) (0.122) (0.119) (0.117) (0.118) (0.119)
Institutional Ownership -0.058 -0.089 -0.122 -0.062 0.154 0.095 0.076 0.127
(0.117) (0.116) (0.118) (0.117) (0.127) (0.125) (0.123) (0.124)
Largest Daily Stock Price Drop -5.355*** -5.467*** -5.278*** -5.321*** -4.189*** -4.416*** -4.339*** -4.287***
(0.601) (0.608) (0.603) (0.601) (0.537) (0.536) (0.531) (0.531)
Constant -2.253** -2.540** -2.099* -2.172** -1.113** -2.396*** -2.160*** -1.994***
(1.092) (1.098) (1.105) (1.106) (0.540) (0.511) (0.513) (0.520)
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 3624 3624 3624 3624 3987 3987 3987 3987
Pseudo R-squared 0.166 0.163 0.168 0.166 0.173 0.161 0.165 0.163
Panel A: 10K Filings (Logit Model) Panel B: 10Q Filings (Logit Model)
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Table 16: Principal Component Analysis – Controlling for Type of Litigations 
The table shows the association between the principal components of degree, readability, and sentiments 
of a firm’s textual disclosure and the probability of the firm being litigated. Panel A has the results from 
analysis of firms’ 10K filings, while Panel B has the results from analysis of firms’ 10Q filings. All models 
control for size (natural logarithm of market value), return on assets (ROA), loss indicator (negative net 
income), earnings growth, sales growth, market-to-book, big-8 auditor dummy, lag size, lag ROA, lag loss 
indicator, lag stock volatility, lag stock return, lag institutional ownership, and dummy indicating whether 
the litigation is either merger-related or accounting related. All models include year and industry (2-digit 
SIC code) fixed effects, with clustering at firm level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Variable definitions are explained in Appendix B. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables D_litigation D_litigation D_litigation D_litigation D_litigation D_litigation D_litigation D_litigation
Disclosure (PCA) 0.137*** 0.285***
(0.028) (0.028)
Readability (PCA) 0.052*** 0.108***
(0.017) (0.016)
Uncertainty % (PCA) 0.207*** 0.215***
(0.034) (0.027)
Uncertainty Count (PCA) 0.157*** 0.186***
(0.036) (0.029)
Size (ln_MV) -0.982*** -0.975*** -0.975*** -0.978*** -0.878*** -0.868*** -0.860*** -0.869***
(0.065) (0.065) (0.066) (0.065) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
ROA 0.018 0.016 0.013 0.016 0.026 0.021 0.021 0.021
(0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Earnings Growth -0.009 -0.008 -0.018 -0.012 0.015 0.033 0.012 0.013
(0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.073) (0.072) (0.049) (0.060)
Sales Growth 0.029 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.013 0.010 0.015 0.013
(0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012)
Loss Indicator -0.482*** -0.466*** -0.504*** -0.487*** -0.591*** -0.477*** -0.527*** -0.538***
(0.098) (0.097) (0.099) (0.098) (0.098) (0.095) (0.096) (0.096)
Lag Size (ln_MV) 1.109*** 1.131*** 1.135*** 1.107*** 0.954*** 1.021*** 1.010*** 0.991***
(0.070) (0.070) (0.071) (0.070) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062)
Lag_Market-to-Book -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Lag_Volatility 0.988*** 1.042*** 0.917*** 0.954*** 0.915*** 1.050*** 0.941*** 0.954***
(0.194) (0.197) (0.192) (0.195) (0.135) (0.137) (0.136) (0.136)
Lag_Return on Assets (ROA) -0.006 -0.015 -0.014 -0.010 0.008 0.002 -0.004 0.003
(0.042) (0.066) (0.048) (0.049) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
Lag_Loss Indicator 0.027 0.080 0.024 0.023 0.006 0.071 0.033 0.037
(0.101) (0.100) (0.100) (0.101) (0.097) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096)
Stock Return -0.085** -0.093** -0.096** -0.087** -0.106** -0.129*** -0.117*** -0.117**
(0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.046) (0.048) (0.044) (0.046)
Big-8 Auditor 0.094 0.095 0.072 0.085 -0.034 0.049 0.020 0.009
(0.121) (0.122) (0.123) (0.121) (0.117) (0.115) (0.116) (0.117)
Institutional Ownership -0.046 -0.081 -0.118 -0.051 0.172 0.110 0.091 0.147
(0.116) (0.115) (0.118) (0.116) (0.114) (0.113) (0.112) (0.113)
Merger Related 0.079 0.128 0.131 0.098 0.084 0.088 0.150 0.121
(0.191) (0.190) (0.189) (0.189) (0.191) (0.187) (0.187) (0.188)
Disclosure Related -0.002 -0.007 -0.002 0.005 0.013 0.010 0.047 0.030
(0.082) (0.082) (0.083) (0.082) (0.077) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076)
Constant -1.664 -1.957* -1.489 -1.558 -0.451 -1.799*** -1.571*** -1.359***
(1.080) (1.086) (1.094) (1.097) (0.535) (0.508) (0.510) (0.516)
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 3,624 3,624 3,624 3,624 3,987 3,987 3,987 3,987
Pseudo R-squared 0.145 0.141 0.148 0.145 0.158 0.144 0.149 0.147
Panel A: 10K Filings (Logit Model) Panel B: 10Q Filings (Logit Model)
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Table 17: Readability Analysis - Pre vs. Post-Plain English Initiative (10K and 10Q Filings) 
The table compares the relationship between textual disclosure (readability) and the probability of a firm being litigated pre- vs. post-Plain English 
Initiative passed in 1998. Panel A has the results from analysis of firms’ 10K filings. Panel B has the results from analysis of firms’ 10Q filings. All 
models control for size (natural logarithm of market value), return on assets (ROA), loss indicator (negative net income), earnings growth, sales 
growth, market-to-book, big-8 auditor dummy, lag size, lag ROA, lag loss indicator, lag stock volatility, lag stock return, and lag institutional 
ownership. All models include year and industry (2-digit SIC code) fixed effects, with clustering at the firm level. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Variable definitions are explained in Appendix B. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation
Automated Readability Index (ARI) 0.128* 0.178***
(0.071) (0.065)
Automated Readability Index (ARI) x Post-PEI -0.096 -0.108
(0.077) (0.070)
Flesch-Kincaid Readability Index 0.183** 0.407***
(0.088) (0.075)
Flesch-Kincaid Readability Index x Post-PEI -0.060 -0.185**
(0.096) (0.083)
Gunning Fog Readability 0.173** 0.363***
(0.084) (0.066)
Gunning Fog Readability x Post-PEI -0.091 -0.189**
(0.091) (0.074)
Smog Readability Index 0.282** 0.536***
(0.123) (0.092)
Smog Readability Index x Post-PEI -0.157 -0.276***
(0.133) (0.104)
Flesch Reading Ease Index -0.073*** -0.113***
(0.025) (0.018)
Flesch Reading Ease Index x Post-PEI 0.030 0.052**
(0.027) (0.020)
LIX Readability Index 0.113*** 0.136***
(0.037) (0.029)
LIX Readability Index x Post-PEI -0.073* -0.068**
(0.039) (0.031)
RIX Readability Index 0.313*** 0.454***
(0.112) (0.090)
RIX Readability Index x Post-PEI -0.190 -0.241**
(0.121) (0.099)
Post-PEI 2.852 1.575 2.445 3.352 -0.173 5.036** 2.298** 2.350 2.665** 3.570** 4.580** -1.748** 3.985** 2.002**
(1.760) (1.517) (1.831) (2.318) (0.787) (2.382) (1.084) (1.617) (1.316) (1.487) (1.811) (0.708) (1.937) (0.944)
Constant -5.123*** -4.949*** -5.616*** -7.024*** 0.030 -8.900*** -4.829*** -6.036*** -7.714*** -8.673*** -10.680*** 2.032** -9.800*** -5.592***
(1.850) (1.659) (1.900) (2.295) (1.279) (2.356) (1.361) (1.516) (1.161) (1.286) (1.555) (0.808) (1.711) (0.858)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732 4095 4095 4095 4095 4095 4095 4095
Pseudo R-squared 0.140 0.142 0.141 0.141 0.143 0.143 0.142 0.138 0.147 0.145 0.146 0.148 0.143 0.144
Panel A: 10K Filings (Litigation Logit Model) Panel B: 10Q Filings (Litigation Logit Model)
Variables
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Table 18: Disclosure Analysis - Pre vs. Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (10K and 10Q Filings) 
The table compares the relationship between textual disclosure (degree) and the probability of a firm being litigated pre- vs. post-Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act passed in 2002. Panel A has the results from analysis of firms’ 10K filings. Panel B has the results from analysis of firms’ 10Q filings. All 
models control for size (natural logarithm of market value), return on assets (ROA), loss indicator (negative net income), earnings growth, sales 
growth, market-to-book, big-8 auditor dummy, lag size, lag ROA, lag loss indicator, lag stock volatility, lag stock return, and lag institutional 
ownership. All models include year and industry (2-digit SIC code) fixed effects, with clustering at the firm level. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Variable definitions are explained in Appendix B. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation
LN (File Size) 0.164* 0.384***
(0.092) (0.076)
LN (File Size) x Post-SOX -0.014 -0.120
(0.109) (0.093)
LN (Word Count) 0.414*** 0.920***
(0.109) (0.111)
LN (Word Count) x Post-SOX 0.105 -0.243*
(0.162) (0.134)
LN (Complex Word Count) 0.478*** 0.916***
(0.113) (0.106)
LN (Complex Word Count) x Post-SOX 0.048 -0.239*
(0.165) (0.129)
LN (Sentence Count) 0.485*** 1.019***
(0.121) (0.121)
LN (Sentence Count) x Post-SOX 0.052 -0.346**
(0.178) (0.143)
LN (Average Words per Sentence) 0.493 2.127***
(0.459) (0.476)
LN (Average Words per Sentence) x Post-SOX 1.246* 0.265
(0.713) (0.724)
LN (Paragraph Count) 0.328*** 0.768***
(0.114) (0.137)
LN (Paragraph Count) x Post-SOX -0.029 -0.337**
(0.171) (0.162)
LN (Average Words per Paragraph) 0.019 0.287
(0.119) (0.196)
LN (Average Words per Paragraph) x Post-SOX 0.220 0.055
(0.225) (0.250)
Post-SOX -0.325 -1.603 -0.938 -0.867 -4.510* -0.365 -1.456 1.306 2.152* 1.782* 2.014** -1.078 1.519* -0.407
(1.533) (1.719) (1.526) (1.327) (2.308) (1.099) (1.035) (1.226) (1.291) (1.071) (0.932) (2.355) (0.881) (1.120)
Constant -4.388*** -6.155*** -6.082*** -5.334*** -3.783** -4.066*** -2.407** -5.988*** -8.960*** -7.550*** -6.565*** -8.697*** -4.858*** -3.229***
(1.490) (1.456) (1.369) (1.272) (1.787) (1.194) (1.114) (0.948) (0.999) (0.833) (0.749) (1.562) (0.729) (0.902)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732 4095 4095 4095 4095 4095 4095 4095
Pseudo R-squared 0.140 0.145 0.146 0.145 0.141 0.142 0.139 0.143 0.157 0.157 0.155 0.142 0.147 0.138
Panel A: 10K Filings (Litigation Logit Model) Panel B: 10Q Filings (Litigation Logit Model)
Variables
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Appendix A: Industry Distribution of Litigations 
The table below reports the industry distribution of 2,335 litigations from 1996-2014 in my sample. Industry code is reported as 2-digit SIC codes 
and their corresponding names. The list is organized in descending order in terms of the number of litigations filed during the sample period. For 
example, business services is listed at the top with 465 litigations from 1996-2014.   
 
Industry Code Industry Name No. of Litigations Industry Code Industry Name No. of Litigations
73 Business Services 465 72 Personal Services 10
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 225 15 Construction - General Contractors & Operative Builders 9
36 Electronic & Other Electrical Equipment & Components 209 57 Home Furniture, Furnishings and Equipment Stores 9
35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment 144 78 Motion Pictures 9
38 Measuring, Photographic, Medical, & Optical Goods, & Clocks 127 12 Coal Mining 8
48 Communications 100 26 Paper and Allied Products 8
60 Depository Institutions 81 27 Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries 8
63 Insurance Carriers 77 42 Motor Freight Transportation 8
80 Health Services 66 32 Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products 7
62 Security & Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges & Services 65 65 Real Estate 7
49 Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 58 31 Leather and Leather Products 6
59 Miscellaneous Retail 50 44 Water Transportation 6
61 Nondepository Credit Institutions 50 55 Automotive Dealers and Gasoline Service Stations 6
67 Holding and Other Investment Offices 45 10 Metal Mining 5
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 41 16 Heamy Construction, Except Building Construction, Contractor 5
37 Transportation Equipment 33 24 Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 5
87 Engineering, Accounting, Research, and Management Services 33 47 Transportation Services 5
20 Food and Kindred Products 31 75 Automotive Repair, Services and Parking 5
99 Services, Not Elsewhere Classified 29 17 Construction - Special Trade Contractors 4
51 Wholesale Trade - Nondurable Goods 26 22 Textile Mill Products 4
82 Educational Services 26 45 Transportation by Air 4
50 Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods 25 70 Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, and Other Lodging Places 4
56 Apparel and Accessory Stores 23 25 Furniture and Fixtures 3
58 Eating and Drinking Places 22 29 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 3
23 Apparel, Finished Products from Fabrics & Similar Materials 21 83 Social Services 3
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 17 07 Agricultural Services 2
53 General Merchandise Stores 14 14 Mining and Quarrying of Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels 2
33 Primary Metal Industries 13 21 Tobacco Products 2
34 Fabricated Metal Products 13 52 Building Materials, Hardware, Garden Supplies & Mobile Homes 2
79 Amusement and Recreation Services 13 01 Agricultural Production - Crops 1
64 Insurance Agents, Brokers and Service 11 40 Railroad Transportation 1
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 10 41 Local & Suburban Transit & Interurban Highway Transportation 1
54 Food Stores 10 Total 2,335
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Appendix B: Variable Definitions 
 
TEXTUAL DISCLOSURE VARIABLES 
Name Definition Source 
File Size Size of the filing (bytes) SEC Filings 
Word Count Number of words in the filing  
Complex Word Count Number of words containing three or more syllables 
in the filing 
SEC Filings 
Sentence Count* Number of sentences in the filing SEC Filings 
Avg. Words Per Sentence Average number of words per sentence in the filing SEC Filings 
Paragraph Count** Number of paragraphs in the filing SEC Filings 
Avg. Words Per Paragraph Average number of words per paragraph in the filing SEC Filings 
 
* Minimum number of words needed to be considered a sentence is five. I follow the methodology provided 
by Gillick (2009)21 to identify sentence boundaries. 
**Minimum number of words needed to be considered a paragraph is ten. 
 
  
                                                          
21 Gillick, D., 2009, May. Sentence boundary detection and the problem with the US. In Proceedings of Human 
Language Technologies: The 2009 Annual Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for 
Computational Linguistics, Companion Volume (pp. 241-244). Association for Computational Linguistics. 
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Variable Definitions (Contd.) 
 
TEXTUAL READABILITY VARIABLES 
Name Definition Source 
 
Flesch Reading Ease 
Index22  
 
Originally developed by Rudolph Flesch in 1948, the Flesch 
Reading Ease Index has been computed using the formula:  
206.835 – 1.015 (the number of words divided by the number 
of sentences) – 84.6 (the number of syllables divided by the 
number of words) 
The Flesch Reading scores vary from 0 and 100. The higher the 
score, the easier the text is to read. For instance, while scores 
between 90 and 100 are considered comprehensible by an 
average 5th grader, scores between 0 and 30 are considered 
understandable by an average college graduate. 
 
 
SEC 
Filings 
Flesch-Kincaid 
Readability Index23 
Flesch-Kincaid Readability Index modifies the original Flesch 
Reading Ease Index and has been computed using the following 
formula: 
0.39 (the number of words divided by the number of 
sentences) + 11.8(the number of syllables divided by the 
number of words) – 15.59 
The higher the Flesch-Kincaid score, the more difficult the text 
is to read. For example, a score of 12 is interpreted as a text that 
a 12th grader would be able to understand.  
SEC 
Filings 
   
 
                                                          
22 Flesch, R. (1948). A new readability yardstick. Journal of Applied Psychology, 32(3), 221. 
23 Kincaid, J. P., Fishburne Jr, R. P., Rogers, R. L., & Chissom, B. S. (1975). Derivation of new readability formulas 
(automated readability index, fog count and flesch reading ease formula) for navy enlisted personnel (No. RBR-8-
75). Naval Technical Training Command Millington TN Research Branch. 
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Variable Definitions (Contd.) 
 
TEXTUAL READABILITY VARIABLES 
Name Definition Source 
 
RIX Readability 
Index24  
 
RIX Readability Index, which is another widely used 
readability measure has been computed using the formula:  
Number of words of length 7 characters or more divided by 
the number of sentences. 
The higher the RIX Readability score, the more difficult the text 
is to read.   
 
 
SEC 
Filings 
Gunning Fog 
Readability Index25 
 
Gunning Fog Readability Index was developed by Robert 
Gunning in 1952 and uses the following formula: 
0.4 (the number of words divided by the number of sentences) 
+ 100 (the number of complex words divided by the number 
of words) 
The higher the Gunning Fog score, the more difficult the text is 
to read.  
 
SEC 
Filings 
Automated Readability 
Index26 
 
Automated Readability Index computes the grade-level 
readability and has been calculated using the formula:  
4.71 (the number of characters divided by the number of 
words) + 0.5 (the number of words divided by the number of 
sentences) – 21.43 
The higher the Automated Readability score, the more difficult 
the text is to read.  
SEC 
Filings 
                                                          
24 Anderson, J. (1983). LIX and RIX: Variations on a little-known readability index. Journal of Reading, 26(6), 490-
496. 
25 Gunning, R. (1952). The Technique of Clear Writing. McGraw-Hill. pp. 36–37. 
26 Senter, R. J., & Smith, E. A. (1967). Automated readability index. Cincinnati University, OH. 
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Variable Definitions (Contd.) 
 
TEXTUAL READABILITY VARIABLES 
Name Definition Source 
   
Smog Readability 
Index27 
 
Smog Readability Index was created by G. Harry McLaughlin 
in 1969 and uses the following formula: 
1.043 x Sqrt (number of complex words x 30/number of 
sentences) + 3.1291 
The higher the Smog Readability score, the more difficult is the 
text to comprehend. 
 
SEC 
Filings 
Lasbarhets Readability 
Index28  
Also known as LIX Readability Index and has been widely used 
to estimate readability of western European languages 
including English. Lasbarhets Readability Index has been 
calculated using the formula:  
(the number of words divided by the number of sentences) + 
(the number of words over 6 letters multiplied by 100 and then 
divided by the number of words) 
The higher the Lasbarhets Readability score, the more difficult 
the text is to read.   
SEC 
Filings 
 
  
                                                          
27 Mc Laughlin, G. H. (1969). SMOG grading-a new readability formula. Journal of Reading, 12(8), 639-646. 
28 Björnsson, C.H. (1968) Lasbarhet. Stockholm, Sweden: Bokförlaget Liber. 
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Variable Definitions (Contd.) 
 
TEXTUAL SENTIMENT VARIABLES 
Name Definition Source 
   
Harvard Negative Word Count29 Number of Harvard General Inquirer Negative 
words in the filing 
SEC Filings 
Harvard Negative Word Proportion Proportion of Harvard General Inquirer Negative 
words in the filing 
SEC Filings 
L-M Negative Word Count30 Number of L-M Negative words in the filing SEC Filings 
L-M Negative Word Proportion Proportion of L-M Negative words in the filing SEC Filings 
L-M Positive Word Count Number of L-M Positive words in the filing SEC Filings 
L-M Positive Word Proportion Proportion of L-M Positive words in the filing SEC Filings 
L-M Financial Weak Modal Word 
Count 
Number of L-M Financial Weak Modal words in 
the filing 
SEC Filings 
L-M Financial Weak Modal Word 
Proportion 
Proportion of L-M Weak Modal words in the 
filing 
SEC Filings 
L-M Financial Strong Modal Word 
Count 
Number of L-M Financial Strong Modal words 
in the filing 
SEC Filings 
L-M Financial Strong Modal Word 
Proportion 
Proportion of L-M Financial Strong Modal 
words in the filing 
SEC Filings 
L-M Litigious Word Count Number of L-M Litigious words in the filing SEC Filings 
L-M Litigious Word Proportion Proportion of L-M Litigious words in the filing SEC Filings 
L-M Uncertainty Word Count Number of L-M Uncertainty words in the filing SEC Filings 
L-M Uncertainty Word Proportion Proportion of L-M Uncertainty words in the 
filing 
SEC Filings 
                                                          
29 I use Harvard’s General Inquirer word list to compute Harvard Negative Word Count and Harvard Negative Word 
Proportion. This word list has been widely used in the extant accounting and finance literature and can be found at 
http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~inquirer/homecat.htm 
30 Loughran and McDonald (L-M) textual sentiments word lists is freely available at Bill McDonald’s website at 
http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/. The details of these lists can be found in Loughran and McDonald (2011) and 
Bodnaruk, Loughran and McDonald (2015). 
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Variable Definitions (Contd.) 
 
LITIGATION VARIABLES 
Name Definition Source 
   
Securities Class Action An indicator variable for the incidence of 
securities class action litigation 
SCAC31 
 
Case Filing Date Date the class action was filed in Federal court SCAC 
Case End Date Date the class action ended SCAC 
Case Status Settled, Dismissed or Ongoing SCAC 
Class Start Date Beginning of the class period SCAC 
Class End Date End of the class period SCAC 
Settlement Amount Actual amount in dollars paid by the defendant 
firm 
Case Summaries, 
10Ks, 10Qs or 8Ks 
  
                                                          
31 Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC), http://securities.stanford.edu/ 
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Variable Definitions (Contd.) 
 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Name Definition Source 
   
Firm Size Natural logarithm of equity market value Compustat 
Market-to-Book Ratio (Total Debt + Market Value of Equity) / (Total Debt + Book 
Value of Equity) 
Compustat 
Analyst Following Natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of analyst following 
the firm 
IBES 
Negative Earnings 
Surprise 
Dummy variable equals to one if SUE Score is negative, and 
zero otherwise32 
IBES 
Volatility Standard deviation of daily stock returns, measured over a 
365-day period 
CRSP 
Return on Assets Net income scaled by total assets Compustat 
Earnings Growth Change in net income relative to the previous year, scaled by 
total assets 
Compustat 
Sales Growth Percentage growth in sales relative to the previous year Compustat 
Loss Indicator Dummy variable equals to one if net income for the year is 
negative, and zero otherwise 
Compustat 
Auditor Quality 
 
Institutional Ownership 
 
Stock Return 
Dummy variable equals to one if the auditor codes are 
between 1 and 8, and zero otherwise 
Total institutional ownership as a percentage of shares 
outstanding 
Natural log of annualized stock return adjusted by inflation 
Compustat 
 
Institutional 
(13f) Holdings 
CRSP 
 
Note: Regressions also include lag values (by one year) of size, ROA, Loss Indicator, Stock Volatility, 
Stock Return, and Institutional Ownership. 
                                                          
32 SUE (Standardized Unanticipated Earnings) Score = (Actual EPS – Surprise Mean) / Standard Deviation. Actual EPS 
is the actual reported earnings. Surprise Mean is the arithmetic average of all estimates on earnings in IBES for a 
given period when a company announces its earnings. Standard deviation measures the dispersion of those 
estimates for a given period.  
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Appendix C.1 Disclosure and Litigation (IBES Controls) – 10K and 10Q Filings 
The table shows the association between disclosure by a firm and the probability of the firm being litigated. Panel A has the results from analysis of 
firms’ 10K filings, while Panel B has the results from analysis of firms’ 10Q filings. All models control for size (natural logarithm of market value), 
return on assets (ROA), loss indicator (negative net income), earnings growth, sales growth, market-to-book, big-8 auditor dummy, number of 
analyst following, negative earnings surprise, lag size, lag ROA, lag loss indicator, lag stock volatility, lag stock return, and lag institutional 
ownership. All models include year and industry (2-digit SIC code) fixed effects, with clustering at the firm level. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Variable definitions are explained in Appendix B. 
 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation
LN (File Size) 0.105 0.255***
(0.079) (0.070)
LN (Word Count) 0.479*** 0.694***
(0.121) (0.109)
LN (Complex Word Count) 0.499*** 0.691***
(0.127) (0.106)
LN (Sentence Count) 0.532*** 0.735***
(0.137) (0.116)
LN (Average Words per Sentence) 0.938** 1.903***
(0.468) (0.524)
LN (Paragraph Count) 0.417*** 0.455***
(0.128) (0.129)
LN (Average Words per Paragraph) 0.009 0.306**
(0.103) (0.149)
Constant -2.024 -5.115*** -4.597*** -3.982*** -3.528* -2.807** -0.717 -1.664 -4.188*** -3.120*** -2.148** -5.194*** -0.587 -0.428
(1.532) (1.634) (1.556) (1.468) (1.852) (1.371) (1.289) (1.124) (1.147) (1.026) (0.956) (1.868) (0.946) (1.038)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2153 2153 2153 2153 2153 2153 2153 2224 2224 2224 2224 2224 2224 2224
Pseudo R-squared 0.132 0.139 0.139 0.139 0.133 0.137 0.131 0.123 0.134 0.134 0.133 0.123 0.126 0.121
Panel A: 10K Filings (Litigation Logit Model) Panel B: 10Q Filings (Litigation Logit Model)
Variables
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Appendix C.2 Readability and Litigation (IBES Controls) – 10K and 10Q Filings 
The table shows the association between readability of a firm’s filings and the probability of the firm being litigated. Panel A has the results from 
analysis of firms’ 10K filings, while Panel B has the results from analysis of firms’ 10Q filings. All models control for size (natural logarithm of 
market value), return on assets (ROA), loss indicator (negative net income), earnings growth, sales growth, market-to-book, big-8 auditor dummy, 
number of analyst following, negative earnings surprise, lag size, lag ROA, lag loss indicator, lag stock volatility, lag stock return, and lag 
institutional ownership. All models include year and industry (2-digit SIC code) fixed effects, with clustering at the firm level. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Variable definitions are explained in Appendix B. 
 
   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation
Automated Readability Index (ARI) 0.049 0.069*
(0.034) (0.036)
Flesch-Kincaid Readability Index 0.101** 0.209***
(0.048) (0.051)
Gunning Fog Readability 0.073 0.177***
(0.045) (0.045)
Smog Readability Index 0.100 0.266***
(0.066) (0.065)
Flesch Reading Ease Index -0.021 -0.055***
(0.016) (0.013)
LIX Readability Index 0.041** 0.067***
(0.019) (0.019)
RIX Readability Index 0.127** 0.212***
(0.056) (0.058)
Constant -1.682 -2.073 -1.997 -2.282 0.020 -2.982* -1.611 -0.705 -2.112* -2.423** -3.471*** 2.844*** -2.967** -0.828
(1.386) (1.372) (1.450) (1.595) (1.332) (1.610) (1.275) (1.167) (1.109) (1.191) (1.347) (0.980) (1.355) (0.960)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2153 2153 2153 2153 2153 2153 2153 2224 2224 2224 2224 2224 2224 2224
Pseudo R-squared 0.132 0.133 0.132 0.132 0.132 0.133 0.133 0.120 0.125 0.124 0.124 0.124 0.123 0.123
Panel A: 10K Filings (Litigation Logit Model) Panel B: 10Q Filings (Litigation Logit Model)
Variables
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Appendix C.3 Sentiment (Count) and Litigation (IBES Controls) – 10K and 10Q Filings 
The table shows the association between sentiment (count) of a firm’s filings and the probability of the firm being litigated. Panel A has the results 
from analysis of firms’ 10K filings, while Panel B has the results from analysis of firms’ 10Q filings. All models control for size (natural logarithm 
of market value), return on assets (ROA), loss indicator (negative net income), earnings growth, sales growth, market-to-book, big-8 auditor dummy, 
number of analyst following, negative earnings surprise, lag size, lag ROA, lag loss indicator, lag stock volatility, lag stock return, and lag 
institutional ownership. All models include year and industry (2-digit SIC code) fixed effects, with clustering at the firm level. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Variable definitions are explained in Appendix B. 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation
LN (Uncertainty Word Count) 0.521*** 0.539***
(0.122) (0.081)
LN (Modal Weak Word Count) 0.488*** 0.312***
(0.089) (0.058)
LN (Negative Word Count) 0.448*** 0.569***
(0.094) (0.070)
LN (Positive Word Count) 0.378*** 0.429***
(0.106) (0.084)
LN (Litigious Word Count) 0.378*** 0.515***
(0.078) (0.066)
LN (Modal Strong Word Count) 0.447*** 0.466***
(0.085) (0.070)
LN (Harvard Negative Word Count) 0.444*** 0.644***
(0.116) (0.094)
Constant -2.980** -2.431** -2.673** -2.322* -2.197* -2.310* -3.176** -0.179 0.609 -0.368 0.136 -0.252 0.699 -1.490
(1.297) (1.238) (1.269) (1.294) (1.215) (1.248) (1.370) (0.849) (0.866) (0.854) (0.846) (0.849) (0.886) (0.909)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2153 2151 2153 2153 2153 2152 2153 2223 2222 2224 2224 2224 2222 2224
Pseudo R-squared 0.141 0.143 0.142 0.137 0.141 0.141 0.139 0.134 0.130 0.143 0.128 0.142 0.135 0.136
Panel A: 10K Filings (Litigation Logit Model) Panel B: 10Q Filings (Litigation Logit Model)
Variables
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Appendix C.4 Sentiment (%) and Litigation (IBES Controls) – 10K and 10Q Filings 
The table shows the association between sentiment (%) of a firm’s filings and the probability of the firm being litigated. Panel A has the results from 
analysis of firms’ 10K filings, while Panel B has the results from analysis of firms’ 10Q filings. All models control for size (natural logarithm of 
market value), return on assets (ROA), loss indicator (negative net income), earnings growth, sales growth, market-to-book, big-8 auditor dummy, 
number of analyst following, negative earnings surprise, lag size, lag ROA, lag loss indicator, lag stock volatility, lag stock return, and lag 
institutional ownership. All models include year and industry (2-digit SIC code) fixed effects, with clustering at the firm level. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Variable definitions are explained in Appendix B. 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation
Uncertainty Word Proportion 34.305* 24.075**
(19.620) (12.214)
Modal Weak Word Proportion 65.293** 26.097*
(30.703) (15.477)
Negative Word Proportion 41.965*** 44.393***
(11.651) (7.234)
Positive Word Proportion -14.756 -30.676
(25.803) (23.626)
Litigious Word Proportion 27.488*** 48.494***
(9.616) (8.824)
Modal Strong Word Proportion 146.120*** 158.614***
(52.572) (45.457)
Harvard Negative Word Proportion 8.119 18.183***
(8.596) (6.895)
Constant -1.012 -0.980 -1.040 -0.554 -0.785 -1.265 -0.927 0.696 0.774 0.612 0.951 0.418 0.523 0.291
(1.225) (1.225) (1.216) (1.228) (1.190) (1.240) (1.251) (0.849) (0.863) (0.848) (0.869) (0.857) (0.874) (0.889)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2153 2153 2153 2153 2153 2153 2153 2224 2224 2224 2224 2224 2224 2224
Pseudo R-squared 0.133 0.133 0.136 0.132 0.134 0.134 0.132 0.120 0.120 0.132 0.119 0.129 0.123 0.121
Variables
Panel A: 10K Filings (Litigation Logit Model) Panel B: 10Q Filings (Litigation Logit Model)
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Appendix D Correlations between Textual Variables 
The table shows the correlations between the textual variables for the sample. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Variable definitions are explained in Appendix B. 
 
Disclosure File Size Word Count Complex word count Sentence count Paragraph Count
Avg. No. of words 
per sentence
Avg. No. of words 
per paragraph
File Size 1.0000
Word Count 0.4213*** 1.0000
Complex word 
count 0.4317*** 0.9947*** 1.0000
Sentence count 0.451*** 0.972*** 0.9788*** 1.0000
Paragraph Count 0.4565*** 0.9385*** 0.9349*** 0.9302*** 1.0000
Avg. No. of words 
per sentence 0.1392*** 0.4400*** 0.4291*** 0.3313*** 0.3155*** 1.0000
Avg. No. of words 
per paragraph -0.0134 0.0471*** 0.0458*** 0.0408*** -0.0563*** 0.1190*** 1.0000
Readability Flesch Reading Ease Index
Flesch-Kincaid 
Readability Index
RIX Readability 
Index
Gunning Fog 
Readability Index
Automated 
Readability Index 
(ARI)
Smog Readability 
Index
LIX Readability 
Index
Flesch Reading 
Ease Index 1.0000
Flesch-Kincaid 
Readability Index -0.8982*** 1.0000***
RIX Readability 
Index -0.808*** 0.9467*** 1.0000
Gunning Fog 
Readability Index -0.8652*** 0.9647*** 0.9415*** 1.0000
Automated 
Readability Index 
(ARI)
-0.6238*** 0.8205*** 0.8882*** 0.8242*** 1.0000
Smog Readability 
Index -0.8763*** 0.9592*** 0.9357*** 0.9966*** 0.8055*** 1.0000
LIX Readability 
Index -0.8349*** 0.9215*** 0.9873*** 0.9248*** 0.8658*** 0.9202*** 1.0000
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Continued 
 
Sentiment 
(count)
LM Negative 
Word (Count)
LM Positive Word 
(Count)
LM Modal Weak 
Word (Count)
LM Litigious Word 
(Count)
LM Uncertainty 
Word (Count)
LM Modal Strong 
Word (Count)
Harvard Negative 
Word (Count)
LM Negative 
Word (Count) 1.0000
LM Positive Word 
(Count) 0.8716*** 1.0000
LM Modal Weak 
Word (Count) 0.7983*** 0.7992*** 1.0000
LM Litigious Word 
(Count) 0.7806*** 0.6934*** 0.5435*** 1.0000
LM Uncertainty 
Word (Count) 0.8986*** 0.8871*** 0.8965*** 0.6032*** 1.0000
LM Modal Strong 
Word (Count) 0.8145*** 0.8366*** 0.8042*** 0.6603*** 0.8311*** 1.0000
Harvard Negative 
Word (Count) 0.9564*** 0.9063*** 0.7638*** 0.7589*** 0.9204*** 0.8123*** 1.0000
Sentiment (%) LM Negative Word (%)
LM Positive Word 
(%)
LM Modal Weak 
Word (%)
LM Litigious Word 
(%)
LM Uncertainty 
Word (%)
LM Modal Strong 
Word (%)
Harvard Negative 
Word (%)
LM Negative 
Word (%) 1.0000
LM Positive Word 
(%) 0.1952*** 1.0000
LM Modal Weak 
Word (%) 0.5161*** 0.4431*** 1.0000
LM Litigious Word 
(%) 0.5601*** -0.0813*** 0.0398*** 1.0000
LM Uncertainty 
Word (%) 0.4648*** 0.3385*** 0.832*** -0.0152 1.0000
LM Modal Strong 
Word (%) 0.2847*** 0.3341*** 0.4878*** 0.0303** 0.4181*** 1.0000
Harvard Negative 
Word (%) 0.7347*** 0.1617*** 0.3848*** 0.3057*** 0.4028*** 0.1351*** 1.0000
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Appendix E Disclosure and Litigation – 10K (With Coefficients on Controls Reported) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation D_Litigation
LN (File Size) 0.152***
(0.058)
LN (Word Count) 0.463***
(0.090)
LN (Complex Word Count) 0.501***
(0.094)
LN (Sentence Count) 0.510***
(0.101)
LN (Average Words per Sentence) 0.995***
(0.357)
LN (Paragraph Count) 0.311***
(0.095)
LN (Average Words per Paragraph) 0.125
(0.101)
LN (Market Value) -0.973*** -0.975*** -0.976*** -0.976*** -0.967*** -0.969*** -0.968***
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.066)
ROA 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.002
(0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033)
Loss Indicator -0.475*** -0.495*** -0.499*** -0.493*** -0.474*** -0.473*** -0.468***
(0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.095) (0.096)
Earnings Growth -0.021 -0.027 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.027 -0.024
(0.054) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.055) (0.052) (0.055)
SalesGrowth 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.009 0.010 0.009
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Market-to-Book 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Big-8 Auditor 0.074 0.068 0.060 0.073 0.078 0.073 0.092
(0.121) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.121) (0.121)
Lag LN (Market Value) 1.120*** 1.106*** 1.103*** 1.105*** 1.131*** 1.115*** 1.135***
(0.071) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070)
Lag ROA -0.008 0.000 0.002 0.000 -0.013 -0.004 -0.017
(0.079) (0.051) (0.047) (0.050) (0.095) (0.064) (0.103)
Lag Loss Indicator 0.099 0.051 0.044 0.049 0.106 0.074 0.115
(0.098) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099)
Lag Stock Volatility 1.022*** 0.983*** 0.982*** 0.976*** 1.036*** 1.000*** 1.031***
(0.193) (0.189) (0.189) (0.190) (0.192) (0.191) (0.193)
Lag Stock Return -0.093** -0.087** -0.086** -0.087** -0.095** -0.092** -0.097**
(0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041)
Lag Institutional Ownership -0.065 -0.035 -0.034 -0.036 -0.065 -0.053 -0.072
(0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.115) (0.114) (0.115) (0.114)
Constant -4.241*** -6.656*** -6.283*** -5.508*** -5.425*** -3.960*** -2.834***
(1.187) (1.307) (1.245) (1.177) (1.511) (1.122) (1.085)
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clusters at firm level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732
Pseudo R-squared 0.140 0.145 0.145 0.144 0.140 0.142 0.139
Panel A: 10K Filings (Litigation Logit Model)
Variables
